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THE LITIGATION FINANCE CONTRACT

MAYA STEINITZ*
ABSTRACT
Litigation funding—for-profit, nonrecourse funding of a litigation
by a nonparty—is a new and rapidly developing industry. It has been
described as one of the “biggest and most influential trends in civil
justice” today by RAND, the New York Times, and others. Despite
the importance and growth of the industry, there is a complete
absence of information about or discussion of litigation finance
contracting, even though all the promises and pitfalls of litigation
funding stem from the relationships those contracts establish and
organize. Further, the literature and case law pertaining to litigation
funding have evolved from an analogy between litigation funding
and contingency fees. Much of that literature and case law views both
forms of dispute financing as ethically compromising exceptions to
the champerty doctrine. On that view, such exceptions create the risks
of an undesirable loss of client control over the case, of compromising
a lawyer’s independent judgment, and of potential conflicts of interest between funders, lawyers, and clients.
This Article breaks away from the contingency analogy and instead posits an analogy to venture capital (VC). It shows the striking
resemblance of the economics of litigation funding with the wellunderstood economics of VC. Both are characterized by extreme (1)
uncertainty, (2) information asymmetry, and (3) agency costs. After
detailing the similarities and differences between these two types of
financing, this Article discusses which contractual arrangements
developed in the area of venture capitalism can be directly applied to
* Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law. I thank Herb Hovenkamp,
Steve Burton, Todd Pettys, Michelle Falkoff, Tom Gallanis, Alan Morrison, Rob Rhee,
Nathan Miller and the participants of the University of Iowa College of Law and University
of Wisconsin Law School workshops for the comments. A special thanks to Victor Goldberg
for stimulating conversations about the similarity between venture capital and litigation
finance as well as comments on an early draft.
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litigation finance, which ones need to be adapted, and how such
adaptation can be achieved. As much of the theory, doctrine, and
practice of VC contracting can be applied or adapted to litigation
finance, practitioners and scholars can be spared decades of trial
and error in developing standardized contractual patterns.
In addition, the analogy turns most of the conventional wisdom in
the field on its head. This Article argues that funders should be
viewed as real parties in interest, funders should obtain control over
a funded litigation, and attorneys should take funders’ input into
account. In return, funders should pay plaintiffs a premium for the
control they receive, subject themselves to a compensation scheme
that aligns their interests with those of the plaintiffs, and enhance
the value of claims by providing noncash contributions. Indeed, on
the suggested view, noncash contribution—as much as if not more
than, capital contribution—should be seen as a key benefit of litigation finance. Courts and regulators should devise rules that
enhance the transparency of the industry—in particular the performance outcomes of various litigation funding firms and their ethical
propensities. Such a legal regime will foster the emergence of a
reputation market that will police the industry and support contractual arrangements.
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INTRODUCTION
Litigation finance—for-profit, nonrecourse funding of a litigation
by a nonparty—is a new and rapidly developing industry globally,
and in the United States in particular.1 So much so, that the RAND
Institute for Civil Justice has dubbed it one of the “biggest and most
influential trends in civil justice,”2 and the New York Times has
recently reported on it at length on its front page and in its “Betting
on Justice” series.3 More generally, litigation funding in all of its
forms—law lending, contingency fees, and nonrecourse funding—is
pivotal for understanding civil litigation as a whole: “[T]he most ...
important phenomena of modern litigation are best understood as
results of changes in the financing and capitalization of the bar.”4
For example, in the United States a market in bankruptcy claims
emerged some twenty years ago and “nothing has changed the face
of bankruptcy in the last decade as much as the new-found liquidity
1. New York City Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 2011-2 § I (2011) (“As of 2011, [the third-party
litigation financing] industry has continued to grow, both as to the number and types of
lawsuits financed and financing provided. The aggregate amount of litigation financing
outstanding is estimated to exceed $1 billion.”). On trends in law firm finance, see Larry
Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 754-59, 788-97 (discussing both
traditional and emerging law firm models).
2. Third Party Litigation Funding and Claim Transfer, RAND CORP., http://www.
rand.org/events/2009/06/02.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2012); see also Maya Steinitz, Whose
Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1270-71 & n.4
(2011). Litigation funding is accelerated by the global recession, which has created more
claims but less funds to pursue them as well as an appetite for new, alternative assets. See
id. at 1283-85. The expansion of litigation funding is also driven by a global transformation
of legal services egged on by the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) ch 2, pt 2.6, div 2, which
allows incorporation of legal practices in Australia, and the Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29,
§§ 71-111, which allows investment in British law firms.
3. E.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Investors Put Money on Lawsuits to Get Payouts, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010, at A1. The report was accompanied by Susan Lorde Martin, Op-Ed.,
Leveling the Playing Field, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2010/11/15/investing-in-someone-elses-lawsuit/leveling-the-playing-field, and
was followed by an additional report on the finance of divorce litigation. See Binyamin
Appelbaum, Taking Sides in a Divorce, Chasing Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2010, at A1; see
also Peter Lattman & Diana B. Henriques, Speculators Are Eager to Bet on Madoff Claims,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 13, 2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/13/speculatorsare-eager-to-bet-on-madoff-claims/ (discussing how investment firms are attempting to buy
trustee-approved claims against Bernard L. Madoff).
4. Stephen C. Yeazell, Abstract, Refinancing Civil Litigation, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK
(June 18, 2002), http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=315759.
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in claims.”5 Due to litigation funding’s increasing salience, courts,
legislatures, regulators, and academics have all, as of late, started
grappling with the phenomenon head on.6
Litigation funding is largely understood as composed of two subindustries. One is usually referred to as “consumer funding”—the
funding of relatively small personal claims, predominantly personal
injury and divorce cases.7 This subindustry has a somewhat longer
history in the United States, going back approximately fifteen years,
to what has in the past been called “law lending.” The second, newer
subindustry is “commercial funding.” This industry relates to the
funding of business disputes, such as disputes relating to intellectual property, antitrust, business contracts, and international commercial and investment arbitration—brought by sophisticated
5. Glenn E. Siegel, Introduction: ABI Guide to Trading Claims in Bankruptcy: Part 2 ABI
Committee on Public Companies and Trading Claims, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 177, 177
(2003).
6. For recent cases addressing litigation funding, see In re September 11 Litig., 723 F.
Supp. 2d 534, 545-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (stating that lawyers cannot pass on to their clients the
cost of financing a contingency suit); Leader Techs. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376
(D. Del. 2010) (refusing to extend the common-interest exception to attorney-client privilege
waiver to include a financier); Abu-Ghazaleh v. Chaul, 36 So. 3d 691, 693-94 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2009) (holding that given the level of control exerted by a funder, that funder rose to the
level of “party”). On the legislative front, Maine became the first state to pass legislation
regulating litigation finance. See An Act to Regulate Presettlement Lawsuit Funding, 2007
Me. Laws 394 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. tit. 9-A, §§ 12-101 to -107 (2007)). Shortly thereafter,
Ohio legalized lawsuit financing by passing H.B. 248, 127th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2008)
(codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (WEST 2008)), and in 2010, Nebraska approved
the Nonrecourse Civil Litigation Act, Legis. B. 1094, 101st Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2010) (codified
at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-3301 to -3309 (2010)). Legislation is currently pending in New York,
see An Act to Amend the General Obligations Law, in Relation to the Regulation of NonRecourse Civil Litigation Advance Contracts, Assemb. B. 5410, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2011), and Delaware, see An Act to Amend Title 6 of the Delaware Code Relating to
Consumer Legal Finance Transactions, H.B. 422, 145th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2010).
Regulatory efforts have also been made by the American Bar Association, see ABA COMM’N
ON ETHICS 20/20, WHITE PAPER ON ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCE (Draft Oct. 19, 2011),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_
2020/20111019_draft_alf_white_paper_posting.authcheckdam.pdf, and the New York City Bar
Association, see New York City Bar Ass’n, Formal Op., supra note 1. For a literature review
of the budding academic discourse, see infra notes 119-21, 123-26, 130. For a literature survey
of earlier works that focused predominantly on law lending—that is, personal injury recourse
loans—and Australian and English literature studying litigation finance in those pioneering
jurisdictions, see Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1279-82.
7. See STEVEN GARBER, RAND CORP., ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED
STATES 9-10 (2010) (RAND Corp. occasional paper), available at http://www.rand.org/
pubs/occasional_papers/ 2010/RAND_OP306.pdf.
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parties and involving larger stakes.8 This Article focuses exclusively
on commercial funding.9 Specialized investment firms dedicated
exclusively to litigation funding have pioneered it in the United
States. However, in addition, what started as a trickle of investments by hedge funds—not specializing in litigation but rather
investing opportunistically—has recently turned into a flood.10
But this growing industry is shrouded in secrecy11 and, to make
matters more complicated, its funding structures are “as various as
snowflakes.”12 Commentators have identified a variety of possible
investment structures. These include recourse and nonrecourse
loans, which can be either secured or nonsecured.13 Investments
may take the form of a purchase, an assignment of a claim, or even
the sale of an interest in the judgment.14 These, in turn, may be
directly or indirectly syndicated.15 Funders may form joint ventures
with other funders; law firms may cofinance with other law firms
using cocounseling agreements; and insurance companies may offer
8. See id. at 13-15. See a discussion of the “first wave” and “second wave” of litigation
funding, including a literature review relating to the former, in Steinitz, supra note 2, at
1277-78.
9. Although acknowledging that litigation funding is a controversial practice, this Article
assumes that litigation funding is an industry whose time has come and proceeds from that
premise to discuss how—not whether—it should take place.
10. Margie Lindsay, Third-Party Litigation Funding Finds Favour with Hedge Funds,
HEDGE FUNDS REV. (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.hedgefundsreview.com/hedge-funds-review/
news/2139727/audio-party-litigation-funding-favour-hedge-funds. This information is also
based on off-the-record interviews conducted by the author with various investors.
11. See Roger Parloff, Have You Got a Piece of This Lawsuit?, FORTUNE (May 31, 2011,
5:00 AM), http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2011/05/31/have-you-got-a-piece-of-thislawsuit; see also Neil Rose, Whatever You Want, LAW SOC’Y GAZETTE (Jan. 17, 2008),
http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/features/whatever-you-want (“This is very much a bespoke
market.”).
12. See Lindsay, supra note 10 (quoting Selvyn Seidel, Founder and Chairman of Fulbrook
Management) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Introduction to UCLA LAW-RAND CTR. FOR LAW & PUB. POLICY CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING AND CLAIM TRANSFER 1, 1 (Geoffrey
McGovern et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS], available at http://www.
rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2010/RAND_CF272.pdf; Selvyn Seidel,
Stakeholders and Products in Third-Party Funding Arrangements, in CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS, supra, at 4, 5; see also Nathan M. Crystal, Professional Ethical Issues in ThirdParty Litigation Financing, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra, at 15, 15-18; Timothy D.
Scrantom, Sources and Structures of Claim Investments, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra,
at 11, 11-12.
14. Crystal, supra note 13, at 15.
15. Selvyn Seidel, An Overview, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 13, at 68.
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litigation insurance products. Other forms of indirect investments
in legal claims, which are beyond the scope of this Article, include
law firm loans offered by banks and equity investment in law
firms.16
One litigation funding firm has disclosed its investment structures to its investors in the following terms:
The Company intends to make use of a wide variety of
investment structures .... Examples of possible structures include, inter alia:
• funding the legal expenses associated with pursuing or
defending a claim in exchange for a payment based on the
claim’s outcome;
• acquiring an interest in all or a part of a claim or claimant at
various stages during the adjudication process, including after
a judgment or award has been rendered;
• lending money, either directly or through a law firm established by the Principals, to fund the activities of a law firm, the
litigation of a portfolio of cases, or the litigation of a single case;
• arranging and participating in structures that remove the risk
of liability from companies’ balance sheets;
• acquiring interests in intellectual property that is the subject
of claimed infringement; and
• participating in post-insolvency litigation trust structures.17

Even within the paradigmatic investment structure of the first
bullet above, which is modeled on the contingency fee, variations
abound.18 How parties choose to structure their litigation funding
agreements depends on a variety of factors such as: (1) the type of
investor—ad hoc institutional investors, such as a hedge fund or
16. Crystal, supra note 13, at 16; Roundtable Discussion Summary, in CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 13, at 21, 22; James E. Tyrell, Lawyer Investments in Claims, in
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 13, at 9, 9; Stephen Yeazell, Third-Party Finance:
Legal Risk and Its Implications, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 13, at 18, 19.
17. Admission Document from Burford Capital Ltd. 21 (Oct. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Burford
IPO memo], available at http://www.burfordfinance.com/docs/default-document-library/
burford-admission-document.pdf.
18. See Rose, supra note 11 (“Allianz has a starting point of 30% of the first £350,000
recovered, and 20% on anything above that. IM relates its take to when monies are recovered,
ranging from 25% for up to six months from the letter of intent, to 50% for over 18 months.
S&W ranges anywhere between 15% and 45%. In general, a funder will be looking for at least
three or four times the sum invested.”).
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bank, or specialized institutional investors, either private or public;
(2) the investor’s needs; (3) regulatory or ethical restrictions; and
(4) tax considerations.19
Despite the increasing importance and growth of the industry,
there is a complete absence of either information about or discussion
of litigation funding contracting—both its theory and its practice.20
Further study of litigation funding agreements is badly needed. To
state the obvious, the litigation funding contract is the foundation
and framework of the funding relationship. The absence of any
guidance on how to contract for litigation funding significantly
raises the transaction costs of such funding because parties must
start from scratch when entering a litigation funding agreement.21
This void also creates an uneven playing field for unsophisticated
clients who cannot afford to negotiate a form contract presented by
an experienced funder. In other words, there is both an efficiencybased and justice-based need for academic discussion of the litigation finance contract, both of which this Article seeks to address.
Additionally, the void leads to a public policy discourse based, at
least partially, on ignorance of how funding arrangements operate
in practice or in theory. Finally, by breaking away from the analogy
to contingency fees, and positing instead an analogy to venture
capital, it becomes clear that in addition to a justice argument in
favor of litigation finance—for example, access to justice—litigation
financiers may be valuable because they can enhance the value of
lawsuits, to the benefit of the original claim holders, by way of
noncash contributions.
This Article therefore aims to fill this gap. The Article develops an
analogy between the economics of venture capital (VC) and of
litigation finance. Both are forms of finance characterized by extreme (1) uncertainty, (2) information asymmetry, and (3) agency
19. See Burford IPO memo, supra note 17, at 12-17, 21-22.
20. Given the novelty of the phenomenon, no model contracts exist. As discussed below,
funders regard such contracts as proprietary and include nondisclosure clauses in them. Few
cases dispute the funding agreement itself and, therefore, no examples of contracts can be
gleaned from courts’ opinions. Even fewer cases have led to public disclosure of the actual
underlying contracts. These are discussed infra Part I.
21. As one litigator framed it, in a private conversation, “litigators like me find themselves
in a position where they have to negotiate highly complex financial deals. This is not what we
are trained to do. And it’s too time consuming to expect a partner from the finance department
to assist since he cannot bill for that time.”
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costs.22 Therefore, much of the theory, doctrine, and practice of VC
contracting, which developed over more than half a century to deal
with similar problems, can be adapted to the litigation funding
context. This insight can represent a quantum leap for practitioners
and scholars—who will not have to muddle through decades of trial
and error—and can allow them to start from a standardized set of
contractual patterns.
Part I explores, as a case study, Burford’s investment in the highstakes, high-profile Chevron/Ecuador dispute. It illustrates that
certain funding relationships make use of VC features but mostly in
order to address funders’ interests, whereas the unequal bargaining
power, regulatory restrictions, and underdeveloped reputational
markets conspire to prevent the development of correlating protections for the plaintiffs.
Part II describes the economics of litigation funding. It details
how the ethical constraints—for example, the risk of plaintiffs losing
control to funders, of waiver of attorney-client privilege, and of
diminished independent judgment by lawyers—translate in
economic terms into magnified agency costs and information
asymmetries. Part II also applies economic, finance, and behavioral
literature to an analysis of legal claims as assets, showing these
assets to be highly risky and uncertain.
Part III describes VC’s lessons learned—how to control similar
extreme uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs
through organizational and contractual arrangements—and suggests arrangements that protect plaintiffs while accommodating
value enhancements by funders. This Part sets out the benefits of
organizing litigation finance firms as limited partnerships, with an
incentive-aligning compensation scheme, that are incentivized and
expected to provide plaintiffs with noncash contributions. This Part
also suggests that contracts between litigation finance firms and
plaintiffs make use of staged financing, representation in case
management, certain negative covenants, and exit provisions. And
it emphasizes the role of reputation and therefore transparency in
policing ethics. This analysis suggests that control should be allocated to funders, but that funders must pay for it—including with
upfront cash when appropriate. It also suggests how the contract
22. See infra Part II.C-D.
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between the litigation finance firm and its investors, on the one
hand, and the attorney retention agreement, on the other, can be
structured to support the litigation finance firm-plaintiff contract.
The Article concludes with a set of conceptual and practical
recommendations. These include reframing our understanding of
funders as real parties in interest, extending attorney-client privilege to facilitate the noncash contribution of funders, pricing and
paying for the complete control endowed to plaintiffs by operation
of law, and encouraging plaintiffs and their lawyers to disfavor
funders who are not specialized and organized as proposed herein.
I. A CASE STUDY: BURFORD’S INVESTMENT IN THE
CHEVRON/ECUADOR DISPUTE
This Part will explore Burford’s investment in the Chevron/
Ecuador dispute as a case study of: (1) how private ordering in
litigation funding is evolving to adopt contractual structures not
dissimilar to those documented in the VC industry pertaining to
funders’ interest in reducing extreme uncertainty, information
asymmetry, and agency costs; and (2) how regulatory restrictions
coupled with a lack of transparency and the consequently limited
reputational markets conspire to prevent the development of the
correlating protections of the plaintiffs, such as compensation for
transfer of control, noncash contribution, and monitoring.
Fortune magazine covered Burford’s investment in the Chevron/
Ecuador dispute based on the premise that
Burford is ... “the largest and most experienced international
dispute funder in the world,” as its promotional materials state,
so we’re not looking here at some aberrational outlier in the
field.... [And,] we can be assured that Burford’s conduct probably
represents the very best practices the young industry has to
offer.23
23. Parloff, supra note 11. Similarly, Professor Anthony Sebok, “who has made a subspecialty of probing the legal and ethical questions surrounding litigation finance,” has been
quoted as saying that there is “nothing unusual from [the] point of view of the litigation
finance world” in this contract. Daniel Fisher, Litigation-Finance Contract Reveals How
Investors Back Lawsuits, FORBES (July 6, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher
/2011/06/07/litigation-finance-contract-reveals-how-investors-back-lawsuits. It is also the
experience of this author, based on interviews as well as a review of the litigation finance
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A. Background: The Chevron/Ecuador Dispute
On February 14, 2011, an Ecuadorian court issued an $18 billion
judgment against Chevron in an environmental litigation brought
against it by a group of indigenous peoples in the Amazonian rain
forest of Ecuador.24 The litigation stems from personal injuries and
environmental damage in the form of the pollution of rain forests
and rivers in Ecuador.25 These damages are a result of oil operations
conducted by Texaco, subsequently acquired by Chevron in 2001,
during drilling operations that lasted from 1964 to 1990.26 When
Chevron acquired Texaco, it also “acquired” what became known as
the Chevron/Ecuador case.27
The award is the largest judgment ever imposed for environmental contamination in any court, and the litigation has been ongoing
for over seventeen years.28 The costs of the litigation up to the
contracts listed below, that the contract, although lengthier and more involved than some, is
not an aberration as it relates to the issues discussed herein. That said, it should be noted
that this investment has some features that may distinguish it from most investments. The
Chevron/Ecuador litigation is a cross-border litigation. Underlying it is a form of class action.
And an unusually large foreign judgment had already been rendered at the time of the
investment. For a prophecy that litigation funding of transnational disputes is set to rise, see
Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Impact of Third Party Financing on Transnational
Litigation, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 159 (2011). Additional contracts reviewed include those
underlying the following litigations: In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 504 (S.D.N.Y.
2009); Trust for the Certificate Holders of Merrill Lynch Mortg. Investors v. Love Funding
Corp., 918 N.E.2d 889 (N.Y. 2009); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d
87 (Tex. App. 2006). Also reviewed were the “Minor Investor” contracts relating to the
Chevron/Ecuador investment discussed below, see Exhibits to Declaration of Kirsten L.
Hendricks, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11-cv-00691-LAK (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011), ECF
No. 355 [hereinafter Minor Funder Contracts], and, for the sake of comparison, standard
forms of consumer investment contracts developed to comply with different states’ consumer
protection legislations, see, e.g., Purchase Agreement Between Dean Plaintiff and Oasis Legal
Finance, LLC (Sept. 13, 2010) (on file with author).
24. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
25. See id.
26. See id. at 597. The claim is a “popular action,” the closest form of joinder to class
action available in Ecuador. See Thomas T. Ankersen, Shared Knowledge, Shared
Jurisprudence: Learning to Speak Environmental Law Creole (Criallo), 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.
807, 814 (2003).
27. See Chevron Corp., 768 F. Supp. 2d at 594 & n.2.
28. Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, NEW YORKER, Jan. 9, 2012, at 38; Simon
Romero & Clifford Krauss, Chevron Is Ordered to Pay $9 Billion by Ecuador Judge, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2011, at A4. The judgment ordered $9 billion dollars in compensatory damages
and another $9 billion dollars in punitive damages, which would become effective if Chevron
did not apologize by February 3, 2012. Chevron did not apologize. See Ecuador: Chevron Will
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judgment were borne by the attorneys who took the case on a
contingency basis.29 Far from concluding the dispute, the Ecuadorian judgment was the opening gunshot in a new phase of appellate
proceedings in Ecuador and parallel proceedings in the United
States and in various foreign and international fora.30
In a satellite litigation in which Chevron is currently suing
claimants’ former lead attorney, Steven Donziger, and advancing
various allegations under the RICO statute, Chevron requested, and
was granted by U.S. District Court Judge Kaplan, Donziger’s entire
case file—documents spanning nearly two decades.31 Among these
documents was the funding agreement between the plaintiffs and
Burford.
B. The Investment Structure
Burford invested $4 million as a first round of investment in the
Ecuadorians’ case in exchange for a 1.5 percent stake in any
recovery, and agreed to provide two additional rounds of investment, in the amount of $5.5 million each, entitling it to a 5.5 percent
share of the recovery.32 The investment was effected through a
Cayman Islands entity called Treca Financial Solutions (Treca).
Treca entered into a funding agreement (hereinafter, the Treca
Agreement or Agreement) with Friends of the Defense of the
Amazon (FDA), a nonprofit, and some forty named individuals
(Claimants) who represent thousands of other villagers. Fortune
magazine summed up the deal:
If Burford ponies up the full $15 million and the plaintiffs end
up recovering $1 billion, Burford will get $55 million. If the
plaintiffs recover $2 billion, Burford gets $111 million, and so on.
Not Apologize for Pollution, Even to Save $8.5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2012, at A7.
29. See Keefe, supra note 28.
30. See Memorandum by Patton Boggs, Invictus: Path Forward: Securing and Enforcing
Judgment and Reaching Settlement 7-8, 12-13, 17-21, available at http://www.earthrights.
org/sites/default/files/documents/Invictus-memo.pdf (setting forth the details of the plaintiffs’
enforcement strategy).
31. Order on Plaintiff ’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order at 2, Chevron Corp.
v. Donziger, No. 11-cv-00691-LAK (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2011), ECF No. 77.
32. Funding Agreement Between Treca Financial Solutions, Friends of the Defense of the
Amazon, and forty named claimants §§ 2.1(a), 3(h) (Oct. 31, 2010) [hereinafter Treca
Agreement] (on file with author).
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But here’s the best part for investors: If the plaintiffs recover
less than $1 billion—all the way down to a mathematical floor
of about $69.5 million—Burford still gets the same payout it
would have received if there had been a $1 billion recovery. In
other words, if there were a $69.5 million recovery, Burford
would still get $55 million, though that sum would, under the
circumstances, constitute almost 80% of the pot. In that event,
by the way, the remaining 20% would not go to the plaintiffs;
rather, it would go to other investors, who are also supposed to
get their returns on investment (not just their capital outlays)
before the plaintiffs start seeing a dime. In fact, under the
“distribution waterfall” set up by the 75-page contract, it is only
after eight tiers of funders, attorneys, and “advisers” (including
the plaintiffs’ e-discovery contractor) have fed at the trough that
“the balance (if any) shall be paid to the claimants.”33

The deal is structured as an assignment of all litigation rights to
a trust set up by the Claimants34 and governed under Ecuadorian
law (the Trust).35 The Trust holds “all of the litigious rights as well
as any and all interest in the Claim, the Award, any proceedings of
the enforcement enforce [sic] the Award, and any proceeds ... of any
of the foregoing held by the Claimants as of the date of the assignment ... (collectively, the ‘Litigation Rights’).”36 The term “Award”—
namely the actual, ex post value of the claim, if successful—is, in
turn, described in a page-long definition and includes:
[The] gross ... value awarded ... by virtue (directly or indirectly)
of ... the Claim, whether by negotiation, arbitration, mediation,
diplomatic efforts, lawsuit, settlement, or otherwise ... plus ...

33. Parloff, supra note 11.
34. Although some forty individuals are named as parties to the agreement, Treca
Agreement, supra note 32, sched. 1, it is the FDA that is “the sole beneficiary of the Claim as
a result of the designation by the Claimants,” id. sched. 1, § 21. The Agreement purports to
bind Claimants who have not signed the agreement. See, e.g., id. § 1.3 (defining the term
“obligations of the Claimants” to mean “obligations expressed to be performed by the
Claimants, whether or not those Claimants are signatories to this Agreement”); id. § 8.4-5
(asserting that FDA must secure the obligations of Claimants whether or not they are bound
by the Agreement). The Agreement purports to empower the FDA to act on behalf of all
Claimants, named and unnamed, including Claimants who are not signatories to the
Agreement. See id. § 8.4.
35. Id. § 23.1.
36. Id. § 8.1(a).
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any recovered interest, penalties, attorneys’ fees and costs ...
plus ... any interest awarded or later accruing .... [And also]
cash, real estate, negotiable instruments, choses in action,
contract rights, membership rights, subrogation rights, annuities, claims, refunds .... [And] including ... the value of, or any
obligation to perform or conduct, any investigation or other
assessment (including ... to assess risk to any human or the
environment), clean-up, remediation, or mitigation or prevention
or measures arising from or relating to the Claim .... “Award”
shall include [all of the above] awarded by the courts of the
Republic of Ecuador otherwise than to the Claimants as a result
of the application of ... Ecuador’s Environmental Management
Act.37

Once the Trust is established, the FDA must cause each claimant
to assign all of his or her litigation rights in exchange for a “beneficial interest in the Trust.”38 Each Claimant must further “irrevocably assign to the Trust all of his ... rights under th[e] Agreement.”39
In a section titled “Independent Actors,” the parties agree that the
arrangement “does not create any joint venture, partnership, or any
... type of affiliation, nor [does it] create a joint ownership of the
Claim.”40 Once the Trust is established, the Trustee must “execute
and deliver to the Funder a joinder agreement by which it assumes
the obligations ... to be performed by the Claimants, whether or not
those Claimants are signatories to” the Treca Agreement.41 The
Trustee and FDA must grant the Funder a “valid, perfected and

37. Id. sched. 3. The term “Claim” itself is defined to include “proceeding[s] in any
jurisdiction ... as the same may be varied or enlarged by the addition of claims and/or
additional parties ... and shall include ... appellate, annulment[,] ... enforcement, ancillary,
parallel or alternative dispute resolution proceedings[,] ... diplomatic or administrative
proceedings[,] ... arrangements, settlements, [and] negotiations.” Id.
38. Id. § 8.2. Any Claimant who “executes an Assignment Agreement shall have exactly
the same rights, obligations and expectations with respect to the Claim and the Award ... as
such Claimant had immediately prior to executing” the assignment. Id.
39. Id. § 8.3.
40. Id. § 16.1. The stated purpose of this section is to avoid any tax implications such
structures may entail, id., but in all likelihood, the purpose is also to avoid any fiduciary
duties, id. § 16.4 (“[N]othing in this Agreement shall give rise ... [to] a fiduciary, lawyer-client,
agency or other relationship between the Parties or between their counsel, notwithstanding
the information or observations or opinions that may be shared between them.”).
41. Id. § 8.4.
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first ranking security interest” in the claim and the award.42 In
other words, if a court awards remedial measures for the benefit of
the harmed community, the Claimants must pay the monetary
value of the Funder’s portion of such remedial measures. The
Claimants may also need to pay the Funder if any award is granted
to nonparties.43
The extensive provisions relating to perfecting a first ranking
security, transferring all rights and proceeds into a Trust, and
installing trusted lawyers and Trustees to manage the Trust are all
mechanisms put in place in order to address one of the greatest
uncertainties relating to litigation, especially transnational litigation or arbitration—the uncertainty regarding the cross-border
enforceability of the rights in an award, as well as the award itself.44
The investment in the Chevron/Ecuador litigation has been
syndicated by Burford, the “Major Funder,” among a variety of
“Minority Funders.”45 Chevron describes in a pleading the entire
web of investment relationships in the following terms:

42. Id. § 8.5
43. Commentators who have written about the commodification problem of litigation
funding have suggested that this may have a chilling effect on accepting remedial measures.
This risk is heightened in tort cases. See infra notes 124-25. It is very likely that these
provisions would not be enforced as against public policy. It is also likely that a court would
cap an arrangement whereby upward of 80 percent of the settlement proceeds go to the
Funder. For example, this is achieved in United States contingency fee cases through the
“lodestar standard”—the standard courts use to assess the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees
in class action cases. According to this standard, courts multiply counsel’s reasonable hours
by a reasonable hourly rate, which is then adjusted by several factors. See Lindy Bros.
Builders, Inc. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 166-69 (3d Cir. 1973)
(establishing the lodestar standard). See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Judicial Review of Class Action Settlements, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 167, 193 (2009) (analyzing
court standards of review for class action settlements).
44. On the challenges of enforcing against foreign assets in transnational litigation and
international arbitration, see Jane L. Volz & Roger S. Haydock, Foreign Arbitral Awards:
Enforcing the Award Against the Recalcitrant Loser, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 867, 871
(1995).
45. See generally Intercreditor Agreement between Treca Financial Solutions, Torvia
Limited, and others (Oct. 31, 2011) [hereinafter Intercreditor Agreement] (on file with
author); Minor Funder Contracts, supra note 23. The Intercreditor Agreement is a contract
entered into by the Claimants via their representative FDA, Treca/Burford as a “Major
Funder,” certain other “Minority Funders,” and the American and Ecuadorian counsel for the
Claimants. It is incorporated by reference into the Treca Agreement, supra note 32, sched. 4,
and it ensures all of the Treca Agreement provisions apply equally to all past, present, and
future investors, Intercreditor Agreement, supra, § 1.28.
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Defendants secured new funding from litigation investment
firms, attorneys, and freelance investors. Much of their new
funding came from New York-based Burford Advisors .... [A]t
the same time they executed the Treca Funding Agreement and
the Intercreditor Agreement, the parties were finalizing an
agreement with Torvia Limited, a company incorporated under
the laws of Gibraltar and owned by Russell DeLeon, a person of
interest in an ongoing federal criminal investigation (“Torvia
Agreement”). Torvia initially invested $2 million in the litigation
on March 4, 2010 and further transferred $1.25 million to [the
former lead plaintiffs’ attorney] on August 17, 2010 for a 3% cut
of the “Net Plaintiff Recovery” from the Judgment.46

Having provided an overview of the agreement, the following
Subsections will highlight similarities between Burford’s approach
to the funding of the Ecuadorians’ claims and mechanisms developed by venture capitalists to protect themselves against challenges
arising from information asymmetry, agency costs, and extreme
uncertainty. These mechanisms include control, staged financing,
information sharing, the duty to cooperate, negative covenants, and
operational efficiencies. This will set the stage for the general theoretical discussion of litigation finance contracting in Parts II and III.
C. The Distribution of Control Between Burford and the
Ecuadorian Claimants
The Trust described above is directed and controlled by “the
Claimants’ Representatives, or a board of managers constituted
under the Trust Deed.”47 These representatives and managers have,
specifically, “the right to direct and control the Trustee with respect
to the pursuit of the claim,” including “the litigation strategy, ... the
appointment and direction of counsel[,] and approval of any
settlement that the Claimants’ Representatives or ... board may
authorize.”48 The Trust Deed is to be drafted in cooperation by
46. Chevron’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for an Order of Attachment
and Other Relief at 12-13, Chevron Corp. v. Doziger, 840 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No.
11-cv-00691-LAK) (citations omitted); see also id. at 13-14 (going on to list additional
individuals and entities investing anywhere from $50,000 to $1 million).
47. Treca Agreement, supra note 32, § 8.1(b).
48. Id.
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Claimants’ and Funders’ attorneys, and the drafting of the deed is
subject to a special dispute resolution mechanism that is different
than the one governing the rest of the agreement.49 For instance,
“the Trustee is the only [p]erson entitled to ... pursue the Claim and
enforce ... the award.”50 All proceeds of the award are to be paid to
the Trust and then distributed in accordance with the Intercreditor
Agreement.51
The Agreement states that both sides agree their “common
interest is served by settling the Claim for a commercially reasonable amount.”52 In a provision that seems contradictory with the
investment structure described above, and which is probably meant
to provide cover in relation to the rules of professional responsibility
that leave absolute control over settlement in clients’ hands, the
Agreement also states that “the Claimants may at any time without
the consent of the Funder either settle or refuse to settle the Claim
for any amount.”53
The key mechanism that provides control to the Funders is the
installment of “Nominated Lawyers.” The Nominated Lawyers are
defined as lawyers “selected by the Claimants with the Funder’s
approval.”54 The law firm of Patton Boggs LLP has been selected to
serve in this capacity, and they have selected James Tyrrell as the
lead Patton Boggs lawyer.55 In fact, the execution of engagement
agreements between the Claimants and Patton Boggs, a firm with
close ties to the Funder, is a condition precedent to the funding.56

49. Id. § 8.1(d).
50. Id. § 8.1(a).
51. Intercreditor Agreement, supra note 45, § 2.2.
52. Treca Agreement, supra note 32, § 4.2.
53. Id. § 4.2.
54. Id. sched. 3.
55. Id. sched. 1, §§ 2.1(a), 3(b).
56. Id. § 2.1(c). The ties between Burford and Patton Boggs generally, and the lead Patton
Boggs attorney named in the Agreement specifically, has been described thus:
Tyrrell is a former [partner] of Burford[’s] chairman ... from the days when both
were partners at Latham & Watkins.... [As Burford was negotiating the Treca
Agreement, it was] subleas[ing] its office space from Patton Boggs’s New York
office, which Tyrrell heads.... [And, most importantly,] Burford is a client of
Tyrrell’s.
Parloff, supra note 11.
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Patton Boggs is also one of the “Active Lawyers”—the lawyers conducting the representation.57
In addition to being actively involved in conducting the representation, the Nominated Lawyers control the purse strings. During the
course of the litigation, authorization of the named, lead Nominated
Lawyer must be obtained for all expenses,58 and only he can effect
the payment.59 At the conclusion of the litigation, the award proceeds must be delivered to either the Nominated Lawyers or the
Trustee, who will manage and distribute them according to the
distribution waterfall.60 In addition to exerting control, it is clear
that the Nominated Lawyers, who among other things control the
purse strings and serve as monitors, supervise the costs and course
of the litigation.61
D. Staged Financing and Right of First Refusal
In the timing of Burford’s provision of funds under the Agreement
we see a form of staged financing common in venture capital. As
discussed above, the litigation funding firm’s capital commitment is
to be funded in three tranches: an initial tranche of $4 million and
two additional tranches of $5.5 million each.62 The Funder retains
a right of first refusal on subsequent rounds, and if it declines to
fund a tranche, the Claimants have a right to secure funding from
other sources.63 In addition, the Funder has termination rights: it
57. Treca Agreement, supra note 32, sched. 1, § 3(c). The overlap is reinforced in the
definition of the “Nominated Lawyers Representative,” which is defined as James Tyrrell or,
if he “ceases to act in [that] capacity, then another lawyer prominently and actively involved
in the Claim selected by the Claimants with [Burford’s] approval.” Id. sched. 3 (emphasis
added).
58. Id. sched. 1, § 2.1. “Expenses” are defined at length and include, among other things,
fees and expenses of lawyers, and fees and expenses associated with any court or arbitral
proceedings, id., but exclude “any expenses of the Claimants themselves” and any “awards
against the Claimants,” id. sched. 1, § 2.2(a), (d).
59. Id. sched. 1, § 2.1.
60. Intercreditor Agreement, supra note 45, §§ 2-3.
61. The explicit language of the contract declares that the Funder is engaged in the
business of investment and not the practice of law or other professional activities, and that
it will not “give or interfere with counsel’s giving of legal advice.” Treca Agreement, supra note
32, § 16.2-3. This language, however, is probably intended to avoid a charge of the
unauthorized practice of law in any of the jurisdictions implicated in the Agreement.
62. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
63. Treca Agreement, supra note 32, §§ 2.1(f), 19.1. However, such funding from third
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may terminate the Agreement in case of a breach of a material
condition, representation, or warranty, as well as due to a breach of
the duty to cooperate64—discussed below. The staged financing
reduces information asymmetry, uncertainty, and agency costs.65
E. Information Sharing, Duty to Cooperate, and Common Purpose
A detailed information-sharing regime is prescribed in a provision
entitled “Claimants’ Duty to Co-Operate.”66 It provides that the
Claimants “irrevocably instruct the Nominated Lawyers to keep the
Funder fully and continually informed of all material developments
... and to provide the Funder with copies of all material
documents.”67 In a separate provision, the Agreement emphasizes
that the Claimants’ duty to cooperate is “of the essence of the
Agreement” as well as a “condition thereof.”68 And in fulfillment of
another condition precedent, the Claimants instruct the Nominated
Lawyers to provide the Funder all material documentation and
material written advice provided by the Nominated Lawyers to the
Claimants, to “respond to reasonable requests for material information from the Funder” on an ongoing basis, and to inform the
Funder of any form of discontinuance of the action.69
The contract then goes on to specify, with some detail, the duties
of cooperation, including duties to:
devote sufficient time and attention[,] ... provide all ... material
Documentation[,] ... submit to examination by the [lawyers] for
the preparation of written statements[,] ... consult with the
[lawyers] as they [prepare to pursue, enforce or settle] the
Award[,] ... appear at any proceedings or hearings[,] ... [and]

parties must be consistent with the Intercreditor Agreement. Id. § 2.1(f).
64. Id. §§ 11.1, 13.4.
65. See infra Part III.B.2.a.
66. Treca Agreement, supra note 32, § 5.
67. Id. § 5.1. In an attempt to preserve the attorney-client privilege over the
communication between Claimants and the Nominated Lawyer, the provision goes on to state
the following: “The Claimants and the Funder agree that the Nominated Lawyers may not
disclose information or documents that the Nominated Lawyers reasonably believe could or
would jeopardize any privilege.” Id.
68. Id. § 13.4.
69. Id. § 13.1(a)-(d).
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cause all persons related to the Claim ... to submit to examination by the [lawyers].70

Given that the information sharing regime structured by the
Agreement would potentially create a waiver of attorney-client
privilege, work-product doctrine, and similar protections, as
discussed below,71 the contract includes a number of provisions
aimed at minimizing this risk. For example, the Agreement states
that “[t]he Parties acknowledge and mutually represent to each
other that it is their common purpose ... to enable the Claimants to
pursue their Claim,”72 as well as, broadly, “that they have a ‘common legal interest’ in the Claim, [the] Agreement, and any discussion, evaluation and negotiation and other communications and
exchanges of information relating thereto.”73
The parties designate as “Common Interest Material” legal
advisers and attorneys’ work product protected by any privilege in
any jurisdiction, as well as “information ... prepared by the
Funder.”74 The parties express their intention that “any Common
Interest Material shall at all times remain subject to all applicable
privileges and protections from disclosure,” and assert that “[i]t is
the good faith belief of the [parties] that common interest privilege
attaches to the Common Interest Material.”75
The Agreement also creates a broad category of “Confidential
Information” in a clause that provides a glimpse into the information the parties anticipated exchanging.76 The term encompasses
matters such as transactional documents and discussions relating
to them; “the existence of the funding ... [and] the identity of the
Funder[s;] ... the factual, legal ... [and] economic ... background of
the claim; ... the procedural status of the claim; the planned
strategies and the tactics[;] ... the expected recover[y;] ... billing
arrangements[;] ... litigation risk product[s] [and] information on
litigation risk markets[;] ... [and] risk modeling.”77 The Agreement
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. § 5.1.
See infra notes 116-17, 137-40 and accompanying text.
Treca Agreement, supra note 32, § 4.1.
Id. § 13.2.
Id. sched. 3; see also id. § 12 (“Confidentiality”); id. § 13 (“Information and Privilege”).
Id. § 13.3.
Id. sched. 3.
Id.
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specifically prohibits any “announcement concerning the existence
of th[e] Agreement, the funding of the Claim ..., or the identity of the
Funder.”78 In other words, in this Agreement the parties forgo any
reputational benefits that may be reaped from making the involvement of a Funder known, especially one that is a market leader.
And, neither party may disclose “for a period of seven ... years
following [the] termination of th[e] Agreement any Confidential
Information or Common Interest Material.”79
These multiple, elaborate, and at times contradictory provisions
capture the tension between the economic imperatives to reduce
information asymmetry and the recognition that the law operates
to increase it.
F. Negative Covenants, Representations, and Warranties
The Treca Agreement contains a number of negative covenants,
representations, and warranties designed to address the problems
of extreme uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs.80
Examples include the Claimants’ covenants not to engage in any
conduct that is “likely to have a material adverse impact in any way
on the Claim [or] the value of the Recovery,”81 not to execute “any
documents which would materially or adversely affect the Claim or
the recoverability of the Award,”82 not to engage in any conduct
“that would result in the Funder receiving proportionately less
payments or less favourable treatment” as compared with other
rights holders in the litigation,83 and not to “institute any [legal]
action ... against any Defendant.”84 By anticipating actions that may
78. Id. § 12.3.
79. Id. § 12.2.
80. “A representation is a statement of fact as of a moment in time intended to induce
reliance.” TINA L. STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS 12 (2007). A misrepresentation gives rise to
a cause of action sounding in tort and allows restitutionary recovery, rescission, and—if
fraudulent—punitive damages. Id. at 14-15. A warranty is a promise by the maker of a
statement that the statement is true. Id. at 13. Its breach gives rise to a cause of action
sounding in contract and may afford the injured parties damages. Id. at 14-15. Therefore, such
broad representations and warranties provide the Funder with breach of contract and tort
claims.
81. Treca Agreement, supra note 32, § 5.2.
82. Id. § 10.2(g).
83. Id. § 10.2(h).
84. Id. § 5.3.
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be beneficial to the Claimants but not to the Funders, these
provisions address agency costs. Claimants agree not to sell any
further portions of the case to other investors without first providing
notice to the Funder, nor to do so in a way that is inconsistent with
the associated Intercreditor Agreement.85
The contract includes a representation that Claimants have
received “legal advice in relation to [the] Agreement and all other
arrangements between themselves, the Funder and the Nominated
Lawyers,”86 as well as, more broadly, that they have “received independent legal advice on the terms and effect of the Transaction
Documents.”87 This language is aimed at a potential charge of a
conflict of interest between the Funder and the Claimants.
The Claimants further represent and warrant that they have not
made any material omissions;88 that they have disclosed “all
documentation and other information in [their] possession or control
relevant to the Claim that is ... likely to be material to the Funder’s
assessment of the Claim and [that they] believe[ ] ... that the Claim
is meritorious and likely to prevail;”89 and that they did “not fail[ ]
to disclose ... any facts ... which ... would ... have led the Funder not
to enter into th[e] agreement.”90 These overlapping and somewhat
redundant representations and warranties address information
asymmetries.
Finally, any attempt to seek relief for breach of the Treca
Agreement in a court of law, as opposed to the international
arbitration institute specified in the agreement; to seek any other
relief or remedies in any forum; or to assert personal jurisdiction
over the investors in a U.S. court, all constitute a breach of the
Agreement.91 Instead, the parties opt for confidential international

85. Id. § 2.1(f). They also covenant not to assign or convey the Agreement or any rights
or obligations thereunder. Id. § 22.1.
86. Id. § 6.1.
87. Id. § 10.2(d).
88. Id. § 10.2(h). For an example of a court recognizing that a litigation funding agreement
may be terminated because of an omission of material fact, see Chevron Corp. v. Doziger, No.
11-cv-00691-LAK, 2012 WL 1711521, at *15-17 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2012).
89. Treca Agreement, supra note 32, § 10.2(1).
90. Id. § 10.2(p).
91. Id. §§ 7.8, 23.7-.8. For further discussion of the dispute resolution mechanism in its
entirety, see infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
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arbitration and, more broadly, for a highly structured and somewhat
unusual dispute resolution mechanism.
All but one of the provisions of the Agreement are governed by the
laws of England.92 The Trustee and the FDA’s obligation to provide
a valid, perfected, first-ranking security interest is governed by the
law of New York.93 All disputes other than the disputes regarding
the value of a noncash award are subject to international arbitration
by a three-member panel administered by the International Centre
for Dispute Resolution (ICDR).94 Disputes regarding noncash award
value are to be resolved by a single arbitrator, who is an accounting
or valuation expert, in an expedited process.95 The legal seat chosen
for any arbitration is London, but the physical location of any
proceeding is in the Cayman Islands.96 As noted, the drafting of the
Trust Deed has a separate dispute resolution mechanism.97
The champerty doctrine, discussed below, creates a legal gray
zone for litigation funding in many jurisdictions;98 this is a characteristic and, more specifically, a risk factor of litigation as an asset.
By tailoring the dispute resolution process and penalizing any
attempt to turn to national courts, the parties are endeavoring to
reduce and control this risk factor and the uncertainty that the
prospect of litigating the Agreement creates. More broadly, these
restrictions on using domestic and foreign courts of law are aimed
at minimizing the uncertainty relating to the many unsettled and
controversial issues regarding the possible interpretation of a thirdparty litigation funding agreement by American and other courts.99
They are also more generally aimed at minimizing the uncertainty
inherent in dispute resolution by a judge or jury.100
92. Treca Agreement, supra note 32, § 23.1.
93. Id.
94. Id. § 23.2-.4.
95. Id. § 23.4.
96. Id. § 23.5.
97. See id. § 8.1(d).
98. See infra notes 131, 134-35 and accompanying text.
99. See generally Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1278-82 (putting the United States regulatory
environment regarding litigation funding in a global context). On the more relaxed attitudes
of international arbitration tribunals towards litigation funding, see generally J.M. Matthews
& M. Steinitz, Editorial, Special Issue: Contingent Fees and Third Party Funding in
Investment Arbitration Disputes, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT., Oct. 2011.
100. Some have described international arbitration as more predictable relative to domestic
adjudication by judges, and certainly juries, because of the perceived tendency of
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G. Operational Efficiencies
The Treca Agreement seeks to enhance returns to the Funders’
investors by minimizing any tax liabilities that may be imposed on
the Award. The Claimants commit to structure the Award, as
broadly defined,101 “in the most tax-efficient manner practicable”
and to “consider ... commercially reasonable methods,” such as a
trust, to achieve that purpose.102 And any taxes that cannot be
avoided are to be borne by the Claimants under the Agreement.103
Other value enhancements by litigation funders via operational
efficiencies can be inferred from the parties’ anticipation of information exchange regarding accountants, law firms, advisors, and
suppliers; business plans and business relationships; market opportunities and marketing plans; and algorithms, intellectual property,
ideas, know-how, knowledge, and research.104 These represent
noncash contributions that the Funder will be bringing to the table.
With this concrete example of Burford’s investment in the
Chevron/Ecuador litigation, the following Section turns to a general
discussion of the economics of litigation finance generally.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF LITIGATION FINANCE
A. The Litigation Finance-Venture Capital Analogy in a Nutshell
The term “venture capital” refers to capital that is pooled, invested in securities, usually stocks, of enterprises in different stages
of development, often in their early days, and professionally
managed.105 Venture capital funds (VCFs) raise money from
arbitrators—who rely on satisfied attorneys, that is, attorneys who have not lost in their
courtroom—to reappoint them in future cases. See Stephanie E. Keer & Richard W. Naimark,
Arbitrators Do Not “Split the Baby”: Empirical Evidence from International Business
Arbitrations, 18 J. INT'L ARB. 573, 576-78 (2001) (discussing both the perception and the
empirical evidence of arbitration decisions).
101. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
102. Treca Agreement, supra note 32, § 20.1; cf. Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer,
Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock,
116 HARV. L. REV. 874 (2008) (discussing tax implications in the VC context).
103. Treca Agreement, supra note 32, § 20.2-.3.
104. Id. sched. 3.
105. William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations,
27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 473 (1990).
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individuals and institutions for investment in early-stage businesses
that offer high potential returns on investment but carry significant
risk of failure.106 The risk is mitigated through diversification—
VCFs develop portfolios of companies, referred to individually as a
“portfolio company.”107
As noted earlier, the term “litigation finance firms” refers to the
practice of specialized funds investing in litigation by providing
finance in return for an ownership stake in a legal claim and a
contingency in the recovery. Like VCFs, which create and manage
portfolios of high risk in potentially high-return companies, litigation finance firms develop portfolios of high-risk, high-return
litigations.108
To state the obvious, both litigation finance and VC are forms of
finance. Financial contracts, generally speaking, are designed to respond to three problems: uncertainty, information asymmetry, and
agency costs. The special character of VC contracting—the essence
of which is investment in high-technology, cutting-edge, sciencebased companies—is that it presents these problems in an extreme
form.109 The same is true of litigation finance, the essence of which
is investing in legal disputes before all facts and procedural aspects
have been ascertained, leading to risks similar to those inherent to
VC investing.
Before expounding on these and other similarities, it should be
noted that there are also important dissimilarities. The first difference, from which others follow, is simply the nature of the asset

106. Francesca Cornelli & Oved Yosha, Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible
Securities, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 1, 1 (2003).
107. Sahlman, supra note 105, at 474-75. Venture capital firms are usually set up as either
open-end funds or closed-end funds. The analysis below applies equally to both. Venture
capital is also sometimes provided by “angel investors”—individuals, often times friends or
family members—who provide seed funding at very early stages of the enterprise’s life.
Similarly, individuals—be they family members or professional investors—may provide
funding to a litigant with an expectation of making a profit should the litigant prevail.
108. Descriptions of such portfolios can be found in the disclosures of the publicly traded
litigation funds. See, e.g., BURFORD CAPITAL INTERIM REPORT 3-4 (2011), available at http://
www.burfordfinance.com/docs/default-document-library/burford_capital_interim_2011_
web.pdf; JURIDICA INVS. LTD., HALF YEARLY REPORT AND UNAUDITED CONDENSED
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 6 (2011), available at http://www.juridicainvestments
.com/~/media/Files/J/Juridica/pdfs/hy2011-report.pdf.
109. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American
Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2003).
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in question. VCFs invest in companies—usually early-stage
companies.110 Litigation finance firms invest in legal claims.111 One
consequence of this difference is that there is more of an understanding and a track record relating to the performance of the
former asset but not of the latter one.
Another consequential difference relates to the social utility of the
asset in question. The positive social utility of VC is universally
accepted: “The venture capital market and firms whose creation and
early stages were financed by venture capital are among the crown
jewels of the American economy. Beyond representing an important
engine of macroeconomic growth and job creation, these firms have
been a major force in commercializing cutting-edge science.”112 To
name but a few examples of companies that were created with the
support of VC, one could list Apple, Intel, FedEx, and Microsoft.113
Conversely, the social utility of litigation funding is controversial.114
Finally, this non-exhaustive list of differences must include the
fact that any litigation funding scheme involves not only investors,
an investment fund, and an investment, but also attorneys—
sometimes acting purely as the representative of the plaintiff and
sometimes acting also as investors in the litigation, through
contingency fees or other forms of alternative billing schemes. The
involvement of an attorney creates a triangular attorney-clientfunder relationship, which raises its own set of agency problems.
The attorney-client relationship is a regulated relationship, and this
regulation further complicates the agency problems:
Beyond concerns relating to control[,] ... [fragmentation of the
attorney’s relationship with the client, on the one hand, and the
funder, on the other] creates conflicts between an attorney’s
interest to maximize fees and those of the financier to do the
same. These divergent interests may lead one to settle early but
the other to proceed to trial .... Similarly, if fee splitting is
prohibited and the attorney receives a flat or hourly fee instead
of a percentage of the recovery, the attorney has less incentive
to properly vet a case as [he] transfer[s] all risk to the funder.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
Gilson, supra note 109, at 1068.
Sahlman, supra note 105, at 482.
See infra text accompanying notes 124-28.
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This moral hazard can increase if claims are then securitized
and further distributed. While both attorneys and funders, as
savvy repeat players, have an interest in creating and preserving reputational gains, this interest may pull them in different
directions in any given litigation and may not be aligned with
the client’s interest.115

Conflicts of interest are not the only complication created by the
triangular attorney-client-funder relationship, which is artificially
fragmented through the operation of the rules of legal professional
responsibility. Client or attorney communication with the financier,
which is necessary for the financier to monitor the litigation, breaks
the attorney-client privilege.116 “[A] lack of such communication
creates information asymmetries between the attorney and the
funder and lowers the funder’s ability to supervise the attorney’s
work,” thereby significantly reducing the potential to have an
“agents-watching-agents” effect, namely the potential cross-monitoring of the lawyers and funders.117
In sum, the triangular, fragmented attorney-client-funder relationship creates, by design, expanded information asymmetries and
has the side effect of magnifying agency costs. The next Subsection
further elaborates on how the ethics regime regulating litigation
funding must affect our understanding of legal claims as assets.
Specifically, it addresses how the path-dependent regulation of
third-party funding, originally developed to address the role thirdparty funding played in land disputes amongst lords in medieval
England,118 affects valuation of legal claims today. It sets the stage
for the argument that we should break away from this path and
instead connect to the path through which the law governing
venture capitalism developed.
115. Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1324.
116. E.g., Leader Techs. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (D. Del. 2010).
117. Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1324-25 & n.200; see also Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching
Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 850 (1992)
(developing the concept of “[a]gents [w]atching [a]gents,” which describes situations when the
self-interests of one set of agents involves monitoring other agents who have a different set
of self-interests that, in turn, may conflict with the interests of the principals); John C. Coffee,
Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 342
(2010) (describing scenarios in which attorneys’ and funders’ respective self-interests
counterbalance each other).
118. Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1287.
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B. Ethical Bounds to Third-Party Profit Making in Litigation
Litigation funding is a controversial industry. Proponents of
litigation funding cite access to justice, leveling of the playing field
between plaintiffs and defendants, free speech, and private enforcement of the law as key advantages of the practice.119 “Thirdparty funding promotes access to justice by enabling plaintiffs who
have meritorious cases to bring litigation they would otherwise be
unable to bring and to avoid premature settlements at a discount
due to the exhaustion of funds.”120 Funding can level the playing
field not only at the level of any given dispute but also on a systemwide level, altering the social function of courts by systemically
equalizing the ability of society’s “have-nots” to use the courts to
affect the path and content of judge-made law via litigation.121
First Amendment arguments in support of litigation funding
include the recognized notion that the right to sue is a First
Amendment right particularly, but not exclusively, in the context of
civil rights litigation, as well as the more contentious claim that
restricting certain forms of law firm financing is a violation of
attorneys’ freedoms of speech and association.122 Last but not least,
private law enforcement is the enforcement of the law by private
parties pursuing legal action for profit, often times using nonclient
financing: “[T]o a unique degree, American law relies upon private
119. See id. at 1276 n.12, 1303 (commenting on access to justice and on how litigation
funding can alter repeat players’ power dynamics).
120. Id. at 1276 & n.12.
121. See id. at 1299-1301, 1303-18 (building upon Marc Galanter’s classical essay Why the
“Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
95 (1974)).
122. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963) (holding that litigation to enforce civil
rights is a form of expression protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments). In a
currently pending lawsuit before three federal district courts, the plaintiffs’ firm Jacoby &
Meyers has sued the states of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut claiming that state
laws prohibiting nonlawyers from owning a stake in law firms unconstitutionally restricts
freedom of speech and association as well as interstate commerce. See Jacoby & Meyers, LLP
v. Presiding Justices, 847 F. Supp. 2d 590, 591-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Complaint at 3-4, Jacoby
& Meyers Law Offices, LLP v. Justices of the Supreme Court of N.J., No. 11-cv-02866-JAP
(D.N.J. May 18, 2011), ECF No. 1; Complaint at 3-4, Jacoby & Meyers Law Offices, LLP v.
Judges of the Conn. Superior Court, No. 11-cv-00817-CFD (D. Conn. Mar. 18, 2011), ECF No.
1; see also Case Comment, Constitutional Law: First Amendment Limitations on State
Regulation of the Legal Profession—Litigation as a Protected Form of Expression, 1963 DUKE
L.J. 545, 550-54.
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litigants to enforce substantive provisions of law that in other legal
systems are left largely to the discretion of public enforcement
agencies.”123
The industry’s critics retort with fear of a deluge of nonmeritorious claims, a distaste for nonparty profiteering from litigation,
a concern about commodification of causes of action, and an
objection to the use of the taxpayer-funded court system for
investment purposes.124 The most vocal opponent of the litigation
finance industry in the United States is the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, which describes the practice in these words:
In a typical case[,] a hedge fund, acting on behalf of already
wealthy investors, will seek to accumulate yet more money—not
by investing in business enterprise or wealth creation—but by
gambling on the outcome of a legal action for damages. They
have no interest in the justice or otherwise of [sic] the case—only
in the chances of success—as they will demand a share of the
damages awarded in return for putting up the stake money.125

Another key concern is that third-party funding will diminish
clients’ control over their claims generally, and in particular in
connection with the decision of when and for how much to settle:
“The argument against litigation funding based on the client’s
123. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff ’s Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 669 (1986); see also Coffee, supra note 117, at 341-42 (arguing that
nonprofit groups in Europe should join forces with litigation funders); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 674-75 (1994).
124. See, e.g., Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of Two Models: Third Party Litigation in
Historical and Ideological Perspective 27 (Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law Searle Ctr. on Law,
Regulation & Econ. Growth, Pub. Policy Roundtable on Third Party Fin. of Litig., Discussion
Draft, Oct. 2009); see also VICKI WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS: LAW, POLICY & FUTURE
DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRALIA, UK & US 48 (2008) (discussing commodification of legal claims);
Paul H. Rubin, On the Efficiency of Increasing Litigation 10-11 (Sept. 24-25, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/
Rubin-ThirdPartyFinancingLitigation.pdf (arguing that the costs imposed by litigation on
defendants are greater than costs borne by plaintiffs, especially when plaintiffs are
individuals or class members and defendants are business firms).
125. JOHN BEISNER ET AL., SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION
FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.instituteforlegal
reform.com/sites/default/files/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf (released by the U.S. Chamber
Institute for Legal Reform).
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diminished control is, in essence, one of separation of ownership and
control between the client and the funder (like the attorney in
contingency cases).”126 The Chamber of Commerce report emphasizes that “litigation-financing arrangements undercut the plaintiff's
control over his or her own claim because investors inherently
desire to protect their investment and will therefore seek to exert
control over strategic decisions in the lawsuit.”127
From the courts’ perspective the difficulty posed by litigation
funding is that
organisations like [the funders] play more shadowy roles than
lawyers. Their role is not revealed on the court file. Their
appearance is not announced in open court.... [T]he court is in a
position to supervise litigation conducted by persons who are
parties to it; it is less easy to supervise litigation, one side of
which is conducted by a party, while on the other side there are
only nominal parties, the true controller of that side of the case
being beyond the court’s direct control.128

Despite the controversy, litigation funding is rapidly expanding
and is, in all likelihood, here to stay.129 To date, those studying the
young litigation funding industry have focused almost exclusively
on the ethics of the practice and its relation to the rules of profes126. Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1323. That article goes on to argue that:
This is, however, a conceptual confusion that is caused by the tendency to treat
third-party funding as identical to attorney funding, in which the party with the
purse strings exerts undue control. But unlike the case of attorney funding, with
litigation funding and claim transfer the client relinquishes full or partial
ownership over its claim. (In fact, arguably, the attorney and client are now both
agents of the funder who co-owns part or the entire claim.) The law should
acknowledge that the client relinquishes or should relinquish partial control
over the litigation as it transfers partial ownership thereof. This, of course,
should be factored into the pricing of the finance in favor of the client.
Id. at 1323-24. The argument herein builds on this view and elaborates on how we can
conceptualize and regulate the funder-client relationship once we let go of the path-dependent
contingency lawyering analogy and view the funders as real parties in interest.
127. BEISNER ET AL., supra note 125, at 7.
128. Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd. v Fostif Pty Ltd. (2006) 229 CLR 386, 487 (Austl.)
(Callinan, J & Heydon, J, concurring).
129. LLOYD’S, LITIGATION AND BUSINESS: TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS 10 (2008), available at
http://www.Lloyds.com/~/media/Lloyds/Reports/360/360%20Liability%20Reports/360_Litig
ationandbusiness.pdf (“Businesses should expect third party litigation funding to rise on both
sides of the Atlantic.”).
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sional responsibility.130 This Article breaks away from this paradigm. However, before turning to that discussion, it is worth
touching on the historical and current ethical constraints on
litigation funding in order to reframe those constraints as forces
that shape the economics of litigation funding.
Where allowed, litigation funding is an exception to the ancient
common law prohibition on champerty. A champertous agreement
is one in which an owner of a legal claim and a third, unrelated
party agree to divide amongst themselves the proceeds of a litigation, if successful. It has also often been referred to pejoratively as
an arrangement between an “officious intermeddler” and a litigant
whereby “the intermeddler helps pursue the litigant’s claim as
consideration for receiving part of any judgment proceeds.”131 The
origin of the champerty doctrine is in medieval English law, wherein
maintenance (the provision of something of value to a litigant in
order to support a litigation), champerty (maintenance for a profit),
and barratry (the bringing of vexatious litigation) were crimes and
torts.132 During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries these crimes
and torts have been abolished throughout the common law world
and replaced with legal ethics rules.133 During the first decade of the
twenty-first century the common law world trend to loosen up
champerty restrictions—now predominantly an ethical violation—
continued.134
Nonetheless, champerty is very much a live and operative
doctrine in many jurisdictions. In the United States, champerty is

130. E.g., Douglas R. Richmond, Other People’s Money: The Ethics of Litigation Funding,
56 MERCER L. REV. 649, 660-64, 669-81 (2005).
131. Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1286-87 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 262 (9th ed.
2009)).
132. See Ari Dobner, Comment, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1543-45 (1996)
(discussing the history of champerty and maintenance laws).
133. For example, in England the crime of champerty has been abolished. See Criminal
Law Act, 1967, c. 58, § 13, sch. 1 (Eng.). In Australia, champerty and maintenance have been
abolished through statutes such as Maintenance and Champerty Abolition Act 1993 (NSW)
and the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 32.
134. The two pivotal decisions are the English Court of Appeal’s decision in Arkin v.
Borchard Lines Ltd., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 655, [16], [45], [2005] 3 All. E.R. 613, which held that
third-party funding is acceptable and even desirable as a way of increasing access to justice,
and the Australian High Court’s decision in Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd. v Fostif Pty Ltd.
(2006) 229 CLR 386, 434-35 (Austl.), which permitted third-party funding and even approved
of the funder having broad powers to control the litigation.
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a common law doctrine which varies by state and entails factspecific, case-by-case analysis: “Of the twenty-eight states that
permit maintenance in some form, sixteen explicitly permit maintenance for profit. The remaining states probably permit champerty
—it is just that they do not explicitly cite the investment by contract
into a stranger’s suit as a permissible form of maintenance.”135
Champerty is not the only ethical hurdle to litigation funding.
Law lenders, who provide recourse loans, are subject to usury laws,
namely the prohibition on excessive interest rates.136 Lawyers
involved in financed cases must make sure not to run afoul of
professional responsibility rules such as the prohibition on fee
sharing,137 the duty to exercise independent professional judgment,138 and the duty of loyalty to the client.139 Close attention has
particularly been given, in the context of the rise of litigation
funding, to the need not to violate or waive attorney-client privilege
or the protection of the attorney work-product doctrine when
communicating with funders.140
Particularly in the United States, ethical rules rooted in the
desire to allow plaintiffs to retain maximum control over their
claims have naturally led to discussions of the industry in ethical
terms, creating a clear obstacle to litigation funding. In economic
terms, however, current ethical rules greatly increase information
asymmetries, and the described conflicts of interest increase agency
costs, while the nature of legal claims—as assets—contributes to
extreme uncertainty. The following Subsections will show that litigation funding shares those same characteristics with VC, paving
the way for the argument that the successful approaches to

135. Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 107 (2011); see also id.
at 98-120 (providing a survey and analysis of the law of maintenance, champerty, and
assignment in all fifty-one jurisdictions and concluding that the answer to the question of how
states determine whether, and to what degree, nonlawyer third parties may support
meritorious litigation is complex and that confusion reigns over the doctrines and their
application).
136. Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Litigation On-Line: Usury and Other Obstacles, 1
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 85, 89-91 (2002).
137. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a) (2010).
138. Id. R. 5.4(a)-(d).
139. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 1.
140. See id. R. 1.6(a) (“A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation
of a client.”); id. cmt. 3 (discussing the attorney work-product doctrine).
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structuring VC can be applied, and in some cases adapted, to
litigation funding.
C. Information Asymmetry and Agency Costs
Venture capitalists face extreme information asymmetry because
the entrepreneurs have all the information about the invention. In
particular, the fact that the company’s technology often involves
cutting-edge science creates substantial information asymmetries
in favor of the entrepreneur, a specialist in said science, over the
venture capitalist. Information asymmetries between investors and
entrepreneurs are further expanded due to the fact that the
intentions and abilities of the entrepreneurs are hard to observe and
assess.141
Litigation financiers face similar asymmetries, because the plaintiffs have private knowledge of the facts, including knowledge of
potentially key facts, harmful “smoking gun” documents, potentially
harmful or weak witnesses, and the like.142 Current ethical rules act
to reinforce plaintiffs’ disincentive to share that private knowledge
with anyone other than their attorneys by withholding privilege
from communications to nonattorney parties.143
The plaintiff ’s intentions and abilities are as hard to observe as
those of an entrepreneur. For example, a plaintiff ’s willingness or
capacity to cooperate effectively with counsel—for instance, by
timely producing documents, or by ensuring that witnesses make
themselves available for deposition—are unknown to the funder.
Whether and to what degree the plaintiff is susceptible to “litigation
fatigue” caused by the emotional stress of litigation, or is an effective witness, are similarly unknown. These information asymmetries are compounded by the deliberate information asymmetries
that result from the attorney-client privilege, discussed above.
Venture capitalists face extreme agency costs because the success
of the venture depends on the efforts of the entrepreneurs, who have
been compensated up front.144 The importance of future managerial

141.
142.
143.
144.

See Gilson, supra note 109, at 1076-77.
See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 137-40 accompanying text.
See Gilson, supra note 109, at 1083-84.
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decisions in the early stage venture creates agency costs that are
amplified by the fact that an entrepreneur’s interest in the venture,
which is now backed by VC, is appropriately understood—in the
same manner as litigation—as an option.145 Therefore, the entrepreneur is now in a conflict of interest vis-à-vis the VC investors with
respect to such issues as the desirable level of risk and the investment duration.146 The entrepreneur will now be inclined to assume
more risk and hold the investment longer than she would have had
the venture been self-financed. The venture capitalist, by contrast,
will be incentivized to liquidate the investment as early as
possible.147 This latter agency problem has been referred to as
“grandstanding” or the “early harvesting” problem.148
The early harvesting problem in the VC context is identical to the
early settlement problem—one of the most commonly cited concerns
of both proponents and opponents of litigation funding.149 Here, the
concern is that funders are incentivized to settle early for a
discounted but secure amount rather than proceed to a costly trial
that may result in a loss or low recovery. They are also incentivized
to underinvest in the litigation because they face diminishing
returns the longer the litigation proceeds.150 And the plaintiff, who
no longer bears the risk of a loss, may now have an incentive to
resist a reasonable and rational early settlement in favor of a late
145. Id. at 1077; see also Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and
Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637, 650-52 (1973) (describing corporate stocks in terms
of options).
146. Gilson, supra note 109, at 1077.
147. Id. at 1074.
148. See id. at 1074-75; Paul A. Gompers, Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry,
42 J. FIN. ECON. 133, 133 (1999) (testing, specifically, “the hypothesis that young venture
capital firms take companies public earlier than older venture capital firms in order to
establish a reputation and successfully raise capital for new funds,” and showing, inter alia,
that “young venture capital firms have been on the board of directors a shorter period of time
... and time the IPO to precede or coincide with raising money for follow-on funds”).
149. Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1313; see also Nicholas Dietsch, Note, Litgation Financing
in the U.S., the U.K., and Australia: How the Industry Has Evolved in Three Countries, 38 N.
KY. L. REV. 687, 692-93 (2011).
150. Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1313; see also Macey & Miller, supra note 43, at 192-94
(2009) (discussing similar agency problems between contingency fee lawyers and clients in
settlement negotiations); Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1313 (“Both problems are exacerbated by
the fact that [funders] make decisions across a portfolio of cases—trading off a small gain in
one case for a larger gain in another case achieved with the same time-investment and
reputational costs.”).
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settlement or even a risky and expensive trial.151 Litigation
financiers also face extreme agency costs because success depends
on plaintiffs’ cooperation in the prosecution of the case after they
have transferred the risk—litigation costs—and a large portion of
the rewards—a significant percentage of the recovery.152 This
particular agency problem, or moral hazard, is well known from the
insurance context in which insurers take on the burden of litigation
but require, via contractual obligations, the cooperation of the
insured.153
D. Legal Claims as Assets and Extreme Uncertainty
Ventures backed by VC are characterized by great uncertainty
and high failure risk and are therefore typically not financed by
banks.154 The general uncertainty inherent in financing is magnified
in the VC context because the portfolio company is at an early stage
and most of the important decisions bearing on the portfolio
company’s success remain to be made. The quality of the company’s
management has yet to be ascertained and investors do not have
certainty regarding the technological soundness or science underlying the venture’s business.155 Further, one of the key risks associated with a VC portfolio company’s investment returns is their
variability.156 Research has shown that while a small number of VC
investments yield a very high return many more result in partial or
151. See Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1313 n.166.
152. Cf. JOHN F. DOBBYN, INSURANCE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 317 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing
the same agency problem between insurer and insured).
153. See, e.g., id.; Michelle Boardman, Insurers Defend and Third-Parties Fund: A
Comparison of Litigation Participation 15-16 (George Mason Law & Econ. Ctr., Working
Paper, 2011) (noting that courts might imply a duty of cooperation even absent a contractual
obligation). Insurance funding of defense is a long-standing form of litigation finance as is
contingency fee, on the plaintiff ’s side.
154. See PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 127 (1999)
[hereinafter GOMPERS & LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE] (explaining why traditional
sources of financing are unsuitable for VC projects); Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Use
of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Partnership Agreements, 39 J.L. & ECON. 463,
465 (1996) [hereinafter Gompers & Lerner, Covenants] (discussing the high-risk investments
of venture capitalists and the tools they use to better manage such investments). In addition,
banks do not invest in litigation financing because it is financing provided upfront with no
expected cash flow for an extended period of time. I thank Victor Goldberg for this comment.
155. See Gilson, supra note 109, at 1076-77.
156. See id. at 1076.
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complete loss. For these reasons, VC returns have been likened to
options—both are characterized by a very small chance of a very
large payout.157
Litigation funding has a similar degree of extreme uncertainty
as does VC. In the case of litigation funding, the litigation is usually
at an early stage and discovery of facts is preliminary at best.
Furthermore, when the subject matter of the litigation requires
specialized know-how—for example, in intellectual property cases,
which can be technology-centered, or in antitrust cases, which can
involve advanced economic theory—or when the case involves new
legal frontiers where doctrine and precedent are undeveloped—such
as in cross-border human rights and mass tort cases158—subject
matter uncertainty can increase overall uncertainty in the same
manner that scientific uncertainty operates in the VC context.
The client’s and the attorney’s control over the litigation create
further uncertainty for the financier. The attorney’s influence over
the litigation, as discussed below,159 is not dissimilar to management’s influence over a portfolio company. In other words, the
quality of the attorney’s decision making, a relative or complete
unknown to the funder, contributes to the uncertainty, especially
when the attorney has been retained prior to the funder’s involvement and without the funder’s input.160
But the most significant source of uncertainty for litigation
funding is the nature of litigation itself. According to a new body of
literature that applies financial theory to law, litigation should be
157. John H. Cochran, The Risk and Return of Venture Capital, 75 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 5
(2005); Gilson, supra note 109, at 1076; see also Sahlman, supra note 105, at 482-83
(emphasizing the great uncertainty regarding returns on individual VC projects). For
example, one of the earliest VC investments, American Research and Development
Corporation’s “ARD,” the first-ever professional VCF formed in 1946, invested in Digital
Equipment Corporation and yielded a return of more than 70,000 percent. See SPENCER E.
ANTE, CREATIVE CAPITAL: GEORGES DORIOT AND THE BIRTH OF VENTURE CAPITAL 107-08, 196
(2008).
158. The Supreme Court is, as of this writing, hearing a pivotal case with broad
implications as to the question of whether corporations can be held accountable for crossborder human rights and environmental abuses. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132
S. Ct. 472 (2011). I note this example because the test case described in Part I is a crossborder mass-tort case.
159. See infra Part III.A.
160. See Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1313 (discussing the motives underlying attorney
underinvestment in any given litigation).
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analyzed as an option, because during the course of a case each
party has an option to settle or select trial. This choice suggests the
application of an option pricing model to legal valuation: “The case
assessment of a civil action follows a random walk like that of a
stock. The up-down movement of probability (expectations [of the
parties]) is a function of information dissemination.”161
Similarly, according to financial theorists of law, legal probability
is not statistical or objective. It is logical and subjective, changing
over the lifetime of a litigation as facts unfold. Thus, while the law
and economics literature models probability as an empirical and
quantifiable concept, when mathematicians considered the application of probability to legal action they rejected the notion that
statistical probability could apply or that such probability was
measurable.162
Further, while classical economic theory of law assumes that
decision standards of deliberative bodies—such as courts and
arbitral tribunals—are a fixed point of reference, both financial
theorists and behavioral economists of law argue, and show, that
the assumption that these bodies apply consistent standards in
similar disputes is unrealistic. This is because judicial proceedings
are not predictable and because the ability of parties and their
lawyers to predict such outcomes are inherently, and deeply,
flawed.163
In particular, behavioral economic analysis of the law literature,
which emerged in the late 1990s and the 2000s and has focused in
no small part on litigation, shows that litigation behavior can be
expressed in terms of three important “bounds” on human behavior:
bounded rationality, willpower, and self-interest.164 Each of the
161. Robert J. Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry into the Selection of
Settlement and Litigation Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J. 619, 664 (2006). A “random walk”
is a mathematical expression of a trajectory that consists of taking successive random steps.
Karl Pearson first used the expression in The Problem of the Random Walk, 72 NATURE 294
(1905). According to Rhee, like stock prices, perceived case values fluctuate based on new
information. Rhee, supra, at 664.
162. See Rhee, supra note 161, at 645-50 (distinguishing statistical probability from logical
probability—the latter being a relationship between premises, facts, inferences, and
conclusions—and discussing the mathematical literature).
163. See id. at 637. The decision of a deliberative body “does not exist ex ante as a fixed
reference point that the parties must discover, but is simply an ex post result that the parties
achieve if they opt for trial.” Id. at 663-64 (emphasis added).
164. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
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three bounds has a documented effect on the ability to generate
sound predictions of the litigation process.165
For example, parties, lawyers, judges, and juries operate based on
heuristics and biases, creating uncertainty as to a dispute’s
outcome. Further, empirical evidence reveals that litigants are not
optimal processors of information. Consequently, parties’ assessments of the likely outcome of the litigation diverge, rather than
converge, as more facts are disclosed—usually, through the discovery regime.166 It turns out that in reality shared information is
likely to be interpreted egocentrically by disputants.167 Parties tend
to “either be overoptimistic in the assessments of cases or construe
the fairness of the situation in a self-serving fashion.”168 Self-serving
inferences and the sunk costs bias have been shown to explain why
certain procedural mechanisms designed to cause more upfront
information sharing and evaluation, “like liberalized summary
judgment ... standards and mandatory disclosures ... may not have
the desired pro-settlement effects” intended.169
Several studies have demonstrated that even experienced litigators are not good predictors of claim value. “The results are consistent: lawyers, insurance adjusters, and judges all err by very
substantial amounts when asked to estimate either the settlement
value or predicted trial outcomes.”170 Empirical research shows that
1471, 1476-77 (1998).
165. See generally 3 BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ed., 2009);
Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1508, 1511 (1998).
166. See Rhee, supra note 161, at 653.
167. George Lowenstein & Don A. Moore, When Ignorance Is Bliss: Information Exchange
and Inefficiency in Bargaining, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 37, 37 (2004).
168. Langevoort, supra note 165, at 1510-11.
169. Id. at 1511; see also Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts
About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73 (1990); Samuel Issacharoff & George
Loewenstein, Unintended Consequences of Mandatory Disclosure, 73 TEX. L. REV. 753 (1995);
Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers’
Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 100-01 (1993) (suggesting that once
lawyers commit to client representation they may be biased in their construal of information
and hence miss warning signs of client fraud); Elizabeth F. Loftus & Willem A. Wagenaar,
Lawyers' Predictions of Success, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 437, 450 (1988) (discussing the effects of
overoptimism on how lawyers assess the probability of success).
170. Stephen C. Yeazell, Transparency for Civil Settlements: NASDAQ For Lawsuits? 9
(UCLA Sch. L. & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 08-15, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1161343##.

494

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:455

lawyers tend to be generally overconfident, and especially so in
cases in which they initially made highly confident predictions.171
Additionally, most lawyers are not experienced trial lawyers since
the vast majority of cases settle.172 They therefore do not have the
required experience that would, perhaps, have afforded them the
ability to soundly assess the likelihood of how a judge or a jury
would decide. The rarity of trials also complicates efforts to value or
model litigation outcome because it results in a lack of adequate
data upon which lawyers or financiers can rest their predictions.
Furthermore, while there is a huge number of settlements—the
market in settlements is estimated to have an annual value of $50
billion, which is similar to the U.S. housing market—this market is
unusual in that we have no information about it.173 Consequently,
pricing information for civil settlements badly lags behind information about comparable markets. “Lacking information about comparable transactions, litigants and their lawyers price [settlements]
in the dark.”174 Financial economics has conclusively shown that
accurate predictions of future prices by individual participants, even
in normal markets, are impossible, and
there is no reason why this truth does not apply with more force
to the predictions of legal decisions given that a civil action is
not subject to market pricing, is not supported by risk management services or a derivative market, and is one of the most
illiquid of assets.175

In sum, it appears that parties and their lawyers cannot be
expected to accurately predict the decisions of deliberative bodies,
accurately assess the risks inherent in litigation, or reliably valuate
a claim. In other words—and alluding to one, oft-cited definition of
risk and uncertainty, according to which risk exists when alternative future states of the world occur with quantifiable probability,
171. See Loftus & Wagenaar, supra note 169, at 450.
172. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 410 (2004) (“[O]ver
96 percent of civil cases do not go to trial.... [In] 2001 almost 98 percent of federal civil cases
were resolved without trial.... [B]ecause many disputes are settled before any complaint is
filed, 96 percent or 98 percent may understate the settlement rate.”).
173. Yeazell, supra note 170, at 6.
174. Id. at 2.
175. Rhee, supra note 161, at 627.
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whereas uncertainty exists when alternative future states of the
world occur without quantifiable probability176—investing in legal
claims is both a risky and a highly uncertain endeavor. Therefore,
it is not surprising that emerging evidence, as well as the budding
literature, suggests that litigation finance returns are highly
variable. Indeed, some have gone so far as characterizing litigation
finance in its entirety as “speculative” and “subprime.”177
The upshot, however, is that case outcomes are not completely
random. Although litigation finance is highly uncertain, funders
may still be able to enhance value through aggregation of claims in
a diversified portfolio and through noncash contributions including
investment of human capital such as expertise, enhancing reputation, and monitoring. In this—as in the magnified information
asymmetries and agency costs characteristic of litigation funding
—litigation funding is similar to venture capital.
With this overview of legal claims as risky and uncertain
investments, of the magnified information asymmetries, and of
agency costs in mind, the next Part offers solutions adapted from
VC. Organizationally, the hallmark solutions are the use of limited
partnerships—in which investors are passive limited partners, and
the general partner is a company comprised of investment professionals who contribute expertise, more so than funds—and an incentive-aligning compensation scheme. Contractually, the cornerstones
are staged financing, the role of management, use of negative
covenants, mid-length investment terms with mandatory distributions, and liquidation. Also key are reputation markets.
The next Part focuses on the recommended contract between the
litigation funding firm and the plaintiff because this relationship is
the heart of the arrangement, is the focus of the concerns surrounding litigation finance, and is a new relationship regarding which
there is virtually no publicly available information. But the Part
also briefly makes recommendations regarding the litigation
funding firm’s contractual relationships with its investors and
highlights the special role the attorney retention agreement can

176. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19-20 (1921).
177. See, e.g., Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry that
Has a Place in the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83, 95 (2008).
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play in supporting the desirable litigation funding firm-plaintiff
equilibrium.
III. VENTURE CAPITAL’S LESSONS LEARNED: CONTROLLING
EXTREME UNCERTAINTY, INFORMATION ASYMMETRY, AND
AGENCY COSTS THROUGH ORGANIZATIONAL AND CONTRACTUAL
ARRANGEMENTS
A. Recommended Organizational Structure
Organizational features of VCFs and the choices made in
structuring the funds, such as profit-sharing rules and self-liquidation, have long-lasting effects on the behavior of venture capitalists
and profound implications for the financed portfolio company and
the funds’ investors.178 The key organizational features—limited
partnerships, compensation, and noncash contribution—are discussed in this Section.
1. Limited Partnerships and Syndication
Most of the financial literature regards the structure of private
equity organizations, and in particular the reliance on limited
partnerships with finite durations, as critical to their success.179 The
typical form of organization in the VC market involves institutional
investors who rely on VCFs, structured as limited partnerships, to
manage their investments.180 The institutional investors are the
passive limited partners, and the general partner (GP) is a money
management company that employs professionals with specialized
expertise. These professionals select and then monitor the VCF ’s
investments on behalf of the ultimate investors with the expectation
of going back to the market to raise additional funds for future
178. See Cornelli & Yosha, supra note 106, at 3, 26-27.
179. Paul A. Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital
Success: Organizational Structure, Incentives, and Complementarities, in CONCENTRATED
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 17, 17, 19-20 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000) (examining the finance
literature’s maxim that the structure of VCFs “has been identified as critical to their success,”
and concluding that the key determinant is the presence of “a strong strategic focus”).
180. Gilson, supra note 109, at 1070; see also Michael J. Halloran et al., Agreement in
Limited Partnership, in 1 VENTURE CAPITAL & PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTATION 1-1, 1-4 to 1-5
(Michael J. Halloran ed., 3d ed. 2011); Sahlman, supra note 105, at 487.
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funds.181 The limited partnership agreement sets the fund’s corporate governance arrangements.182 Pursuant to the laws that
govern limited partnerships, the limited partners are precluded
from interfering in the day-to-day fund management, especially as
it may relate to investments in a given portfolio company.183
Usually, the investment is then syndicated to include additional
VCFs as investors in the fund’s portfolio.184
2. Compensation
The GP’s compensation is composed of a small annual management fee calculated as a low percentage of committed capital—2
percent is common—and “carried interest,” which is usually 20
percent of the realized profits.185 Although superficially homogenous, there are subtle and important differences across the compensation provisions in VCF-investor agreements, with larger, more
established VCFs, for example, providing for more variable compensation schemes that are more finely tuned to reflect performance.
The compensation scheme plays a central role in the VC setting
because the limited partners cannot use many of the methods of
disciplining managers found in corporations—such as a powerful
board of directors and the market for corporate control. “[I]ndividual
partnership agreements are rarely renegotiated ... [and] compensation is one of the most contentious issues between limited and

181. Gilson, supra note 109, at 1071.
182. Id.; see also Sahlman, supra note 105, at 489.
183. Gilson, supra note 109, at 1071. This alone solves some conflicts of interest that
currently exist in litigation funding but are beyond those that arise in the triangular attorneyclient-funder relationship and therefore are not the focus of this Article. For example, the
individuals who invest in the litigation funding firm may do so in order to gain access to the
confidential information of, or cause trouble to, a competitor who is the target of a funded
lawsuit.
184. Id. at 1073; see also Josh Lerner, The Syndication of Venture Capital Investments, 23
FIN. MGMT. 16, 16-17 (1994) (researching the patterns of syndication and explaining the
different motivations of syndicating the first round of investments as opposed to later rounds
and the conflicts of interest between the lead investor and other investors in later rounds).
185. Gilson, supra note 109, at 1072. This is a generic description of the compensation
structure. For a more nuanced, empirical analysis of VC compensation agreements, see also
Kate Litvak, Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements: Understanding Compensation
Arrangements, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 161, 172-75 (2009).
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general partners of venture funds.”186 If adopted in the litigation
funding industry, similar compensation structure will, as detailed
in the next Section, align the GP’s interests with those of both the
investors and the plaintiffs.
3. Noncash Contribution
“The GP’s principal contribution to the [VCF] is expertise, not
capital.”187 Although not formally—that is, contractually—required,
the GP “is also expected to make ... noncash contributions to the
portfolio company ... [in the form] of management assistance, ...
intensive monitoring of the portfolio company’s performance ... and
the use of the [GP]’s reputation to give the portfolio company
credibility with potential customers, suppliers, and employees.”188
For this reason, “[v]enture capitalists are generally seen as valueadded investors who have played a significant role in the development of many entrepreneurial businesses.”189
This point has far-reaching implications for how we conceptualize
the role of litigation funders. Perhaps one of the key insights that
the analogy between the two forms of financing provides is the
noncash contributions of the GPs to the fund and the investments
—that is, the litigations. Given the uncertainty and variability of
legal claims, it could be argued that the major value added by the
GP to the litigation funding firm is similarly the expertise of the
principals. Rather than attempting to restrict this contribution as
we do now by frowning upon any shift of control from the plaintiff
to the litigation funding firm—and rather than impeding communication between the funder, on the one hand, and the plaintiff and
186. Paul A. Gompers & Josh Lerner, An Analysis of Compensation in the U.S. Venture
Capital Partnership, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
187. Gilson, supra note 109, at 1071.
188. Id. at 1072.
189. Vance H. Fried et al., Strategy and the Board of Directors in Venture Capital-Backed
Firms, 13 J. BUS. VENTURING 493, 493 (1998); see also Christopher B. Barry et al., The Role
of Venture Capital in the Creation of Public Companies: Evidence from the Going-Public
Process, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 447, 449 (1990) (examining a set of IPOs “by [VC]-backed companies
between 1978 and 1987,” and finding “that venture capitalists specialize their investments
in firms to provide intensive monitoring services,” and further finding that “[t]he quality of
their monitoring services appears to be recognized by capital markets through lower
underpricing for IPOs with better monitors”).
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her lawyer, on the other—the law should endorse and facilitate
private ordering that opts into these value-enhancing arrangements. They benefit the plaintiffs as much as they do the funder.
The principals of litigation funding firms tend to be seasoned
lawyers who build heavily on their reputation and connections
within the legal community.190 Their background and standing as
senior lawyers position them to select promising cases, assets that
the investors—pension funds, university endowments, wealthy individuals, and so on—do not have specialized expertise in selecting for
themselves. They can and do assist in case development,191 for
example making litigation strategy choices and developing novel
legal theories. In other words, they can enhance value by reducing
unique, case-specific risk. In addition, litigation funding firms
appear to be in the early stages of developing subject-matter specializations.192 Some funds, for example, invest exclusively or predominantly in intellectual property cases.193 Other funds concentrate on
international arbitration and have in fact evolved from firms that
specialize in conducting discovery or enforcement in foreign jurisdictions.194 Some funds emphasize their intention to avoid investing
in class actions.195 Such subject-matter expertise will further enable
funders to reduce unique risk.
The personal experience and reputations of these lawyers-cumfinanciers further position them to monitor both plaintiffs and

190. See Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1300.
191. Lindsay, supra note 10 (“Fulbrook, sa[id] Seidel, is different from other litigation
funders. ‘We not only evaluate a case and fund it by advancing capital, but we also put
together integrated human resources to evaluate and enhance claims. We do not just advance
money, but also work with the claim after it’s funded to try to enhance, to give value. This is
a little different than most established funders,’ he explain[ed].”).
192. See Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1316-17.
193. These are sometimes referred to as “patent trolls.” See, e.g., Caroline Coker Coursey,
Battling the Patent Troll: Tips for Defending Patent Infringement Claims by NonManufacturing Patentees, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 237, 237 (2009).
194. For example, one company based out of London specializes in “cost assessment for
international arbitration” and “management of cross border litigation [and] international
arbitration for claimants [and] funders.” Services, GLOBAL ARB. LITIG. SERVICES, http://www.
globalarbitrationlitigationservices.com/services.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
195. Juridica, for example, states that it “focus[es] exclusively on business-to-business
related claim[s]” and that “[i]t does not invest in personal injury, product liability, mass tort,
or class action claims.” About Juridica, JURIDICA INVESTMENTS LTD., http://www.
juridicainvestments.com/about-juridica/investment-policy.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
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lawyers, thereby reducing the costs of the litigation.196 Lawyers are
in a better position to know how other lawyers may squander
resources. If allowed, this is the second key way in which litigation
funding firms can enhance value not only for themselves and their
investors, but also for the plaintiffs. Finally, the involvement of the
litigation funding firm, “if [it becomes] known to the opposing party,
[is likely to serve] as a signal ... regarding the strength of the
case.”197 This may induce earlier, and therefore more cost-effective,
settlements.
Given the strong similarities between the economic problems of
VC—which have resulted in the evolution of these organizational
structures—and those that characterize litigation funding, litigation
funding firms would be well served by organizing similarly. Namely,
litigation funding firms should be specialized funds that operate
based on the principles of modern portfolio theory. The pooled
investments that are litigation funding firms should be organized as
limited partnerships. This structure will recognize that the GPs
should exert disproportionate control over the investments and over
their management.198 Their compensation structure should also be
composed of a small management fee and a large uplift in case of
success. This compensation structure will align the GP’s interests
with those of the investors—the GP’s disproportionate control over
the various investments and over the litigation funding firms
notwithstanding—and facilitate the GP’s noncash contribution to
both investors and plaintiffs. Finally, this structure will isolate investors from their cases, avoiding potential conflicts with defendants.
With this suggested organizational structure in mind, the next
Sections will describe in brief the recommended contractual structure for the litigation funding firm-investor contract, the attorney
retention agreement, and in length the key contract: the litigation
funding firm-plaintiff contract. The emphasis on the litigation
funding firm-plaintiff contract is due to its centrality to the claim
transfer transaction, the near-complete lack of publicly available
information regarding these crucial contracts, and the fact that the
196. See Steinitz, supra note 2, at 1276, 1336.
197. Id. at 1305.
198. See infra Part III.B.1.a.
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litigation funding firm-investor contract and the retention agreement should be quite similar to the well-documented and -theorized
VCF-investor contract and contingency fee agreements, respectively.
I will nonetheless describe both briefly, for the sake of completion
and in order to show their beneficial effects by way of their “braiding,” described below, with the litigation funding firm-plaintiff
contract.
B. Recommended Contractual Structure
This Section will detail the recommended structure of the three
contracts that govern litigation finance: the litigation funding firminvestor contract, the litigation funding firm-plaintiff contract, and
the attorney retention agreement.
1. The Litigation Finance Fund-Investor Contract
The way to achieve the organizational structure recommended
above is through the contract between the investors and the litigation funding firm. The litigation funding firm-investor contract
should be similar to the VCF-investor contract: a limited partnership agreement. This means that it will be characterized by “[near-]
complete control vested in the GP, [a] highly incentivized compensation [scheme], mandatory distribution of realized investments, and
mandatory liquidation after a fixed term.”199 These are described
briefly below.
a. Control and Compensation
As noted before, the GP’s main contribution is its noncash
contribution. In order for the investors to benefit from the GP’s skill
and experience, however, they must give significant discretion and
control to the GP. In fact, GPs of VCFs obtain control that is
completely disproportionate to both their capital contribution and
their carried interest.200 The consequence is a VCF corporate governance scheme that brings the general corporate governance
199. Gilson, supra note 109, at 1087-88.
200. Id. at 1088; see also Litvak, supra note 185, at 173, 175.

502

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:455

problem of the separation of ownership and control to an extreme.201
Such discretion is counteracted through the compensation structure.
Most of the GP’s compensation, as discussed above, consists of the
carried interest. The distribution of carried interest, which happens
only when profits are realized, is simultaneous to the GP and to the
investors. The GP’s carried interest compensation can be subjected
to claw back provisions.202 Such a compensation structure compensates for the conflicts created by the separation of ownership and
control by realigning the interests of the GP and the investors.203
b. Mandatory Distributions and Liquidation
The aforesaid compensation structure creates another agency
problem: under certain circumstances it may incentivize the GP “to
prefer investments of greater risk than the investors” would
prefer.204 One response to this agency problem is the VCF ’s fixed
term. “The ... fixed term assures that at some point [in time] the
market will [fix and] measure the GP’s performance, making [it]
readily observable” to future investors in successor funds.205 Fixed
terms are key to reputation markets, which, in turn, are key for the
ability to raise successive funds.206 Moreover, both “[m]andatory
distribution of the proceeds from realized investments and the ...
fixed term ... allow the investors to measure the [GP’s] performance
against [available] alternatives.”207
The desirability of separation of ownership and control coupled
with an incentive-aligning compensation structure are applicable in
a straightforward fashion to the recommended litigation funding
201. Gilson, supra note 109, at 1088. Also referred to as the Berle-Means problem, this
term refers to the fact that shareholders as individuals lack the ability to control a corporation
even though in the aggregate they are its owners. The professional management—who are
conceptually employees of the shareholders—have greater control over the corporation’s
resources than do the actual owners. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDNER C. MEANS,
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 3-5, 64-67 (rev. ed. 1968).
202. Gilson, supra note 109, at 1089.
203. Id. Gilson describes how this compensation structure creates an incentive for the GP
to realize profitable investments prematurely and how so-called “claw back provisions” deal
with this particular agency problem. See id. at 1072, 1074 (internal quotation marks omitted).
204. Id. at 1089.
205. Id. at 1090.
206. See id.
207. Id. at 1089-90; see also Sahlman, supra note 105, at 499.
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firm-investor contract. It is already the case that—at least in some
reported cases—investors, in fact, typically do not know which cases
the litigation funding firm is invested in.208 The key difference
between the VCF-investor contract and the litigation funding firminvestor contract is the need, in the latter case, for an ethical wall
between the investors and the litigation funding firm so that any
privileged information provided to the litigation funding firm is
preserved, assuming the latter benefits from the attorney-client
privilege. Such a wall will obviously increase the information
asymmetry between the investors and the litigation funding firm.
But the limited partnership structure already accounts for such
expanded information asymmetry.
The application of the use of mandatory distribution and liquidation is a bit less straight forward. Although these are beneficial for
the investors—and although the average length of a large-scale
business dispute litigation is three years,209 making it naturally
suited for midterm investments—any given litigation may take
longer. The most obvious example is when an appeal may be
required. Therefore, a plaintiff may wish to contract for a commitment to provide additional funds or at least a right of first refusal
for funds from the GP’s successor funds.
2. The Litigation Finance Fund-Plaintiff Contract
This agreement is the heart of the suggested scheme because at
the heart of litigation finance is the transfer of all or part of a claim
from the plaintiff to the funder. This section will explore the key
features such a contract should include: staged financing, negative
covenants, representation in management, highly incentivized compensation, and appropriately timed exit provisions. It will also note
the important role of a reputation market as an economic force that
further binds, informally and implicitly, the GP.

208. See Parloff, supra note 11.
209. John B. Henry, Fortune 500: The Total Cost of Litigation Estimated at One-Third
Profits, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Feb. 1, 2008, at 28, available at http://drystonecapital
.com/pdf/total_cost_litigation.pdf.
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a. Staged Financing
The first recommendation is to contract for staged financing.
Staging, a widely used financing technique in VC, refers to the
infusion of capital over time.210 It helps mitigate all three problems:
extreme uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs.211
In staged financing,
[t]he venture capitalist retains the option to abandon the
venture whenever the forward looking net present value of the
project is negative. Financing rounds are usually related to
significant stages in the development process such as completion
of design, pilot production, first profitability results, or the
introduction of a second product. At every stage, new information about the venture is released.212

Thus, generally speaking, uncertainty is decreased with every
further round of investment because new information becomes
available.
First round investors are not obligated to participate in later
rounds of investment though they may do so, but they would have
to negotiate the terms of such later rounds at the time such
investments are made, which is usually after certain milestones
have been reached. In contrast, the VCF may reserve the right to
participate in the later rounds through a right of first refusal
provision.213 Often, the entrepreneur retains the right to seek additional financing from sources other than the VCF if the latter does
not wish to further invest or if it is requiring too high a price in
order to do so. 214
Litigation funding can similarly be staged. Examples of relevant
milestones in the litigation context would be the survival of a case
past an important motion, such as a motion to dismiss, the completion of some or all of the documentary discovery, the completion of
a first round of depositions, or the exchange of expert reports. At
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Gilson, supra note 109, at 1073.
Id. at 1078-81.
Cornelli & Yosha, supra note 106, at 1; see also Sahlman, supra note 105, at 505.
Gilson, supra note 109, at 1073.
Id. at 1079.
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each one of these junctures new information is revealed and uncertainty reduced. Financiers may participate in future rounds of
investments but the elimination of the right of first refusal may be
a desirable modification in the litigation funding context. Such a
modification would strengthen the plaintiff vis-à-vis the funder,
thus addressing the litigation-specific public policy concerns regarding disproportionate control without disrupting the equilibrium
achieved in the VC context.
Beyond shifting exogenous uncertainty from the funder to the
entrepreneur or plaintiff, staged financing aligns the interests of the
funder and the entrepreneur or plaintiff by tying additional funding
to performance and achievements. Endogenous uncertainty, namely
uncertainty caused by the entrepreneur’s or plaintiff ’s ability to
influence the value of the venture through his or her actions or
inaction, is also reduced by staged financing because such staging
increases the incentives of the entrepreneur or plaintiff to expand
the effort needed to maintain or enhance the value of the venture or
litigation.215 In other words, it reduces agency problems.216
The first information asymmetry problem addressed by staged
financing is the fact that when deciding between various possible
investments—be they startup companies or litigations—a funder
has to differentiate between desirable and undesirable investments
even though the funder is disadvantaged in comparison to the
entrepreneur or plaintiff because the latter have better, private
information regarding his or her skills, or about the merit of his or
her claim in the case of litigation. It is obviously in the self-interest
of the entrepreneur or plaintiff to overstate the quality and likely
outcome of the company or of the litigation. “Because the incentive[s] created by staged financing [are] more valuable to a good
entrepreneur [or plaintiff] than a bad one,” staging operates as a
sorting mechanism.217 The readiness of an entrepreneur or plaintiff

215. Id. at 1080.
216. Id. at 1079-80; see also Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the
Staging of Venture Capital, 50 J. FIN. 1461, 1461-63 (1995) (finding that “[a]gency costs
increase as the tangibility of assets declines, the share of growth options in firm value rises,
and asset specific grows;” noting that “higher R&D intensities” function similar to discovery
by “lead[ing] to shorter funding durations;” and providing evidence that staging “allows [VCs]
to gather information and monitor the progress of firms”).
217. Gilson, supra note 109, at 1080.
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to hold off and receive additional rounds of funding only after
milestones have been achieved serves as a signal of skill or of the
merits of the case, as applicable. Such a signal is particularly
important in the absence of a performance track record in the case
of a first-time entrepreneur or a nonrepeat-player plaintiff.218
In both contexts, the information asymmetry problem persists
beyond the initial selection phase. In fact, the information asymmetry gap is likely to increase over time as the entrepreneur or
plaintiff learns more about the company or the litigation. The information asymmetry is even more pronounced in the litigation
funding context than in the VC context because of the limitations on
communication set by the attorney-client privilege and because of
the value-diminishing effect that any disclosure of communication
between the attorney and the client to the funder would have if
privilege is not extended. Staged financing, by pegging additional
funding to the achievement of milestones—and by imposing penalties should the entrepreneur or plaintiff fail to meet those
milestones, which have been specified ex ante—renders the entrepreneur’s or plaintiff ’s projections more credible.219
Staged financing is also understood by economists as one of three
mechanisms that allocate control. The typical VC arrangement
allocates to the VCF control over the entrepreneur and the enterprise through at least three mechanisms—one of which is the
mechanism of staged funding. The second and third mechanisms are
the use of negative covenants and representation on the portfolio
company’s board of directors.220 The latter two mechanisms provide
for control, and reduce uncertainty, in between financing rounds.221
The former mechanism provides control at the time of the funding
rounds themselves and, by providing an “out,” reduces overall
uncertainty.222

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Cf. GOMPERS & LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE, supra note 154, at 128-30.
Gilson, supra note 109, at 1081.
Id. at 1073-74.
Id. at 1082.
Id. at 1078-79.
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b. Role in Management
The problem of control, from an economics rather than ethics
perspective, is that the entrepreneur, and by analogy the plaintiff,
exercises discretion and control over the portfolio company’s or the
litigation’s day-to-day decision making.223 They also have increased
information as the company or litigation develops. Furthermore,
since no contract between an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist
can anticipate every possible disagreement,224 the venture capitalist
typically plays a role in the operation of the company.225 Control in
the form of representation on the portfolio company’s board of
directors often takes the form of “disproportionate representation or
even [complete] control of the portfolio company’s board of directors.”226
Venture capitalists sit on boards of directors, help recruit and
compensate key individuals, work with suppliers and customers,
help establish tactics and strategy, play a major role in raising
capital, and help structure transactions such as mergers and
acquisitions. They often assume more direct control by changing
management and are sometimes willing to take over day-to-day
operations themselves. All of these activities are designed to
increase the likelihood of success and improve return on
investment.227

223. See supra note 201.
224. As such, the VC and litigation funding contracts are “incomplete contracts.” On
incomplete contracts, also known as relational contracts, see Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:
Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational
Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 886-900 (1978), and Ian R. Macneil, Reflections on
Relational Contract Theory After a Neoclassical Seminar, in IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF
CONTRACT 207, 207-17 (David Campbell et al. eds., 2003).
225. Sahlman, supra note 105, at 508 (documenting that lead venture investors spend an
average of 100 hours in direct contact with each portfolio company).
226. Gilson, supra note 109, at 1082; see also Fried et al., supra note 189, at 493, 495
(noting that “[o]ne of the most significant value-added activities of the venture capitalist is
involvement with strategy,” and contrasting boards of VC-backed funds with “board members
in public companies who are typically either managers (insiders) or outsiders hand-picked by
the CEO. As a result they may emphasize politeness and courtesy at the expense of truth and
frankness” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
227. Sahlman, supra note 105, at 508; see also id. at 506 (“Most agreements call for venture
capitalist representation on the company’s board of directors .... Often, the agreement calls
for other mutually acceptable people to be elected to the board.”).
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Applying this insight to litigation funding, one could envision a
recognized role for the litigation financiers in the day-to-day
management of the litigation. Such a role can include the raising of
additional funds, helping in formulating legal tactics and litigation
strategy, and assisting in structuring the ultimate settlement
agreement in the same manner as VCFs help structure key deals
executed by portfolio companies.
The influence funders appear to require in particular over the
attorney—of both her selection and her strategic decisions—can be
viewed as the functional equivalent of the VCF’s representation on
the portfolio company’s board of directors. Therefore, part of the
newly allocated control could take the form of approval of the
selection of attorneys, who are the “managers” of litigation because
they usually make most, if not all, of the tactical and strategic
decisions during the course of the litigation. Control allocated to the
funder will encourage ongoing monitoring of the investment, namely
of the company or the litigation.228
As the analysis of the financing of the Ecuadorian plaintiffs in the
Chevron/Ecuador dispute in Part I illustrates, control, or at least
involvement in and influence over the selection or approval of attorneys, is de facto practiced by some in the industry.229 Such involve
228. See M.J. Goldstein, Should the Real Parties in Interest Have to Stand Up?—Thoughts
About a Disclosure Regime for Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration, TRANSNAT’L
DISP. MGMT., Oct. 2011, at 9-10 (“A decade ago when third-party finance in international
arbitration was truly in its infancy ... [funders imposed] contract terms on the financed party
that created release points for the financers. Finance contracts ... not infrequently provided
that a financer could discontinue financing if developments in the case gave rise to a
materially increased risk ... of an unfavorable outcome. Some finance contracts of that era
provided that the financed party ... bore an obligation to prosecute the arbitration in a
reasonably prudent fashion, and upon breach of this duty the financer could elect to
discontinue financing while retaining its interest in the proceeds—this election being provided
either expressly or, less transparently, as a principle of the applicable contract law selected
by the financer in its standard contract. And some such contracts included as express
conditions the commitment of the financed party to seek from the arbitral tribunal an
accelerated determination of one or more issues material to the claimant’s prospects of
ultimate success—so that the financer could reach an early decision point to continue or
terminate financing based on re-assessment of the risk.”).
229. The Australian legal system has arrived at a similar conclusion and allows for a good
measure of funder control. The lead case is the High Court’s 2006 decision Campbells Cash
& Carry Pty Ltd. v Fostif Pty Ltd. (2006) 229 CLR 386 (Austl.), in which a five-to-two majority
held that third-party funders may exercise significant control over the litigation, and that this
control is not an abuse of process and does not offend the public policy in states that have
abolished maintenance and champerty. Id. at 388-89. The New York City Bar notes in its
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ment, influence, and control can take the form of installing a chosen
lawyer, as in the Chevron/Ecuador example; providing a list of
preapproved law firms to select from; or passing over a claim due to
the existence of a representation not acceptable to the funder.
But the transfer of control has a price for the venture capitalist.
The capital structure of VC represents a calculus of the private
value for control—namely, it assigns a value to the transfer of
control from the entrepreneur to the VCF.230 Litigation financiers
would similarly have to pay for the additional control. Moreover, the
pricing of the control in the litigation funding context would have to
take into account the extra control—indeed, absolute control—
endowed by operation of law to the plaintiff, an endowment that
takes the form not only of the champerty doctrine but also the
duties of loyalty and independent judgment, which require that the
attorney be controlled by the client alone.231
c. Negative Covenants
Control is also exercised in VC through the use of negative covenants. Examples of the restriction of the entrepreneur’s discretion
through the use of negative covenants include restrictions on the
entrepreneur’s ability to make certain key decisions that may
significantly influence the course of business of the venture, or the
ability to significantly depart from any business plan approved by
the VCF.232 By analogy, litigation funding contracts can and do
include covenants that require approval by, or at least consultation
in good faith with, the litigation funding firm before making strategic litigation decisions such as forum selection, the filing of key
opinion that a client may agree to permit a financing company to direct the strategy or other
aspects of a lawsuit, including whether and for how much to settle, and similarly
acknowledges the potential value of funder involvement, but leaves it to private contracting
rather than interpret the law as allocating any control to the funder. See New York City Bar
Ass’n, supra note 1, § II.E.
230. See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital
Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 252-53, 258-59 (1998) (discussing
models that seek to explain the incentive function of capital structure and that calculate the
private value for control); see also Rhee, supra note 161, at 629-38 (discussing the standard
economic model of bargaining).
231. See supra notes 115-17, 126-27, 131-40 and accompanying text.
232. Gilson, supra note 109, at 1074. But see Gompers & Lerner, Covenants, supra note
154, at 472-74.
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motions, and the decision to settle. Each level of control, as discussed, will have to be bargained and paid for. Indeed, one can
envision legal claims so attractive that a funder will not only foot
the bill but also pay an additional cash amount to the plaintiff.
d. Highly Incentivized Compensation, Exit, and Reputation
As mentioned before, the GP’s compensation is composed of a
small management fee, which represents a small percentage of committed capital and, more significantly, the carried interest, which
represents a much larger percent, often twenty. This compensation
structure responds to the agency costs and information asymmetry
problems by creating a powerful performance incentive that aligns
the incentives of the VCF with that of the portfolio company, as the
overwhelming majority of the fund managers’ compensation depends on the success of the portfolio company.233 This compensation
structure does, however, incentivize the entrepreneur to take on
more risk than she would have had the risk/reward balance not
been altered by the provision of capital by the VCF. But since the
risk has shifted from the entrepreneur to the VCF, the latter now
has an incentive to monitor the portfolio company.
In the litigation funding context, such a structure is only a slight
modification of the contingency fee, in which there is no management fee at the outset, but it includes a return on investment that
is usually a large percentage of the settlement or judgment.234
At the conclusion of an investment, a VCF exits by selling the
portfolio company or by taking it public. The limited partnerships
usually have ten year terms, or medium-term investments.235 This
creates
a strong incentive [to the GP] to cause the fund’s portfolio
company investments to become liquid as quickly as possible.
Assuming that the GP has invested [all] of a fund’s capital by
233. Gilson, supra note 109, at 1083.
234. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH.
U. L.Q. 739, 757-59 (2002) (challenging the myth that contingency fees are standardized at a
rate of 33 percent and, instead, documenting a broad range of fee arrangements); Rose, supra
note 11 (documenting the broad range of percentages and associated contingencies in the
litigation finance context).
235. Gilson, supra note 109, at 1074.
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the midpoint of the fund’s life, the GP then must seek to raise
additional capital for a new fund in order to remain in the VC
business. Because the performance of a GP’s prior funds will be
an important determinant of its ability to raise capital for a new
fund, early harvesting of a fund’s investments will be beneficial
to the GP.236

Whereas VCFs exit during an IPO or the sale of the company, a
successful exit for the litigation funder takes the form of either a
settlement or a favorable judgment. That means that instead of
investment bankers and the markets pricing investments, it is
juries, judges, and arbitral tribunals who substitute for markets in
the litigation funding arena.237 And because the average life of a
complex business litigation is three years,238 litigation naturally
presents a similar medium-term investment horizon.
The equilibrium struck by the organizational and contractual
structure of VC, including the characteristic implicit contractual
provisions of such arrangements, is supported and policed first and
foremost by the market forces of the greater VC market—including
the force of reputation. For example, a claim by an entrepreneur
that a venture capitalist declined an IPO when one was offered by
a reputable investment banker would quickly circulate through the
community and hurt the venture capitalist in the future when
competing with other venture capitalists.239 This is especially true
given that the pool of portfolio companies that merit investing in,
and the pool of VCFs, are both small. Effective reputation markets
are characterized by the following: First, the party that has discretion and whose reputation is in question, namely the investment
firm, must be a repeat player. Second, market participants must
have similar normative views on what is appropriate behavior on
the part of financiers. Third, compliance or breach of the implicit
contract, described below, by the litigation funder must be observable.240
236. Id. at 1074-75; see also Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Does Venture Capital
Require an Active Stock Market?, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1999, at 36, 44.
237. See Yeazell, supra note 170, at 2.
238. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
239. See Gilson, supra note 109, at 1087.
240. Id. at 1086; see also D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information
Age, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 133, 157-62 (1998) (discussing the characteristics of the
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The analogy between litigation funding and VC helps us see that
some of the protection to plaintiffs that counterbalances the transfer
of control in the suggested investment structure comes from the
“braiding” of the VCF-investor contract with the VCF-entrepreneur
contract—especially the braiding of reputation and exit.
“Braiding”—observable in business contexts characterized by high
levels of uncertainty such as VC and corporate acquisitions—refers
to the intertwining of two or more contracts such that each contract
includes provisions that operate as implicit terms in support of the
arrangements contained in the other. As a consequence of braiding,
the contractual efficiency of both of the braided contracts is
increased.241 Often, formal contracting in one contract is used to
create arrangements that render transparent the abilities and
character of the parties, thus creating trust. That trust supports a
second “braided” contract. Braiding has been observed in situations
in which the project’s—or, in our case, the litigation’s—exact trajectory or goal cannot be defined and predicted with precision, but
rather emerges over time and through the parties’ joint efforts.242
Analogously, the manner of the litigation’s development is uncertain: costs, duration, and the disposition of pretrial disputes—to
name but just a few examples—are unclear and communication and
cooperation between two or more parties—the litigation funding
firm, the plaintiff, and the lawyers—are required. Also analogous is
reputation market for venture capitalists).
241. Gilson, supra note 109, at 1091; see also Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding: The
Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 1377, 1386, 1422-23 (2010); id. at 1377 (“Parties respond to rising uncertainty by
writing contracts that intertwine formal and informal mechanisms ... in a way that allows
each to assess the disposition and capacity of the other to respond cooperatively and
effectively to unforeseen circumstances. These parties agree on formal contracts for
exchanging information about the progress and prospects of their joint activities, and it is this
information sharing regime that ‘braids’ the formal and informal elements of the contract and
endogenizes trust.”).
242. Gilson et al., supra note 241, at 1385; see also Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for
Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 45051 (2009) (“In the new arrangements ... the primary output is an innovative ‘product,’ one
whose characteristics, costs, and manufacture, because of uncertainty, cannot be specified ex
ante.... [T]he process of specification and development will be iterative .... Thus, central to
these transactions are communication and cooperation across the two (or more) firms—the
design, specification, and determination of manufacturing characteristics will be the result
of repeated interactive collaborative efforts by employees of separate firms with distinct
capabilities.” (emphasis added)).
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the nature of the complex commercial disputes that are invested.
These too have imprecise goals, such as whether to go to trial,
engage in mediation, or negotiate a settlement, and then what type
of relief to pursue.
In the VC context, two forms of braiding are at play: the braiding
of the reputation markets and the braiding of exit. The VCF ’s
noncash contribution is most valuable to the portfolio early on in
the venture’s life. As the venture develops, and the entrepreneurs
gain experience and develop their own reputation, the value of the
VCF ’s management experience, reputation, and similar noncash
contribution diminishes. As a consequence, the value of the VCF’s
noncash contribution to a given portfolio company diminishes over
time, and the closer that portfolio company gets to a sale or to an
IPO, the more profitable it is for the VCF to reinvest its noncash
contribution in new ventures with less experience and reputation.
Economies of scope, however, create a nexus between cash and
noncash contributions because cash contribution acts as a signal
that enhances the reputation of the portfolio company. Therefore,
“recycling the venture capital fund’s noncash contributions also
requires recycling its cash contributions.”243 The braiding of exit
enables investors to evaluate a GP’s capabilities and candor, and
therefore align the GP’s interests with those of the investors. The
need to exit the relationship with the investors forces the VCF also
to exit its relationship with the entrepreneur. The VCF’s exit from
its relationship with the entrepreneur, in turn, gives the entrepreneur a performance incentive.244
The operation of the reputation markets is similarly braided.
They constrain the GP in its dealings with the entrepreneur because
reputation affects the investor-VCF relationships, which are
necessary for future fund raising by the GP. The entrepreneur
receives a “windfall” in the form of fair play and competence by the
GP who wishes to maintain a good reputation in order to succeed in
raising new funds.245
Like the limited universe of portfolio companies, the universe of
commercial disputes large enough to yield the three- to four-times
243. Gilson, supra note 109, at 1076.
244. Id.; see also Gilson et al., supra note 241, at 1412-15.
245. See Gilson, supra note 109, at 1072, 1075-76; Gilson et al., supra note 241, at 1392-97.
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multiplier return, as a third of the settlement or award, is limited.
Additionally, a finite list of “Biglaw” firms serve as gatekeepers of
such claims.246 Therefore, the conditions are ripe for a reputation
market to emerge.
For the full benefits of the organizational and contractual structure offered herein to inhere in the litigation funding industry, we
must witness the emergence of a robust, mature litigation finance
reputation market. And for that to happen, transparency regarding
both contractual arrangements and a fund’s performance is necessary. There are indications that we are headed in that direction. For
example, recent negative publicity regarding Burford’s investment
in the Chevron/Ecuador case in financial publications such as
Fortune is a reputational cost to the firm and its principals. The
intense focus on the industry generally, which is only likely to increase given how much litigation funding is expected to reshape civil
litigation, is further reason to believe that the emergence of a
reputation market is imminent.247
Beyond the need for the three attributes discussed above to be
present in the litigation funding reputation market, it is advisable
for investors and plaintiffs who wish to benefit from the favorable
effect of reputation on their litigation finance contract to prefer
specialized, repeat-player firms. Similarly, courts should encourage
transparency by refraining from sealing finance contracts when they
are subject to litigation, as they currently often do.248 Finally, good
practice guidelines should be developed.
In sum, if litigation funding firms will organize in the same
manner as VCFs, as I suggest, the benefits of the braiding of reputation and exit will inhere to both the investors and the plaintiffs in
246. See Yeazell, supra note 170, at 5-6 (estimating the average value of a federal lawsuit
settlement as $10,000). The American Lawyer’s—the leading trade publication—Am Law 100
list can fairly be considered the list of gatekeeper “Biglaw” firms. See The Am Law 100 2011,
AM. LAW. (May 1, 2011), http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=12025502
68433.
247. See, e.g., Richard Lloyd, The New, New Thing, AM. LAW. (May 17, 2010), http://www.
americanlawyer.com/PubArticleFriendlyTAL.jsp?id=1202457711273 (showing the cover story
in the leading trade journal); supra note 3 (discussing a series of New York Times write-ups).
248. This has been the case, for example, in a recent dispute between Juridica, a litigation
finance firm, and a former investee, S & T Oil Equipment & Machinery. See S & T Oil Equip.
& Mach., Ltd. v. Juridica Invs. Ltd., No. 11-H-0542, 2011 WL 1565996 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 25,
2011), appeal dismissed, 456 F. App’x 481 (5th Cir. 2012).
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a similar fashion as in the VC context. Both instances of braiding
will serve to enhance the efficiency of the litigation funding firminvestor and the litigation funding firm-plaintiff contracts. In
addition, the need to go back to the markets and raise successive
funds will buttress the protection of plaintiffs, despite the relinquishment of control.
Like the litigation funding firm-investor contract, the attorney
retention agreement is important, and implicit, in an analysis of the
litigation funding firm-plaintiff ’s contract. The litigation funding
firm-investor contract is braided not only with the litigation funding
firm-plaintiff contract but with the attorney retention agreement as
well. Therefore, the next Subsection describes briefly this agreement
as well as its braiding effects.
3. The Attorney Retention Agreement
Attorneys’ retention agreements, also known as engagement
letters, are nonmandatory, have come into the mainstream in the
past couple of decades, and are underresearched.249 Nonetheless,
some general practices are observable. Retention agreements often
include “boiler plate” provisions such as identification of the client
and definition of the scope of representation, withdrawal from and
closing of representation, and dispute resolution.250 Some questionable provisions, such as a “right to settle” provision purporting to
disallow settlement without the lawyer’s consent, also appear with
some frequency.251 Fees, costs, and billing, including clarifications
regarding the advancement of costs by the lawyer, are at the heart
of even the most concise of retention agreements.252
As retention agreements get more complex, they include contingency fee representations and closing calculation clauses, and
settlement structures become more common and elaborate. These
249. See D. Christopher Wells, Engagement Letters in Transactional Practice: A Reporter's
Reflections, 51 MERCER L. REV. 41, 41 (1999); see also William C. Becker, The Client Retention
Agreement—The Engagement Letter, 23 AKRON L. REV. 323, 323-24 (1990).
250. See Wells, supra note 249, at 49.
251. Becker, supra note 249, at 328 (noting that some of the agreements studied provided
that the client would not settle the case without a lawyer’s consent or without the consent of
both client and lawyer, and characterizing such provisions as questionable given the client’s
absolute right to decide on settlement, enshrined in the rules of professional responsibility).
252. Id. at 329-32.
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detail methods for accounting for final distribution to the client
when various items are to be deducted from the gross recovery and
order of payment. Such agreements also provide for division of fees
among lawyers. Last but not least, cooperation clauses that place an
affirmative obligation on the client to cooperate with the attorney
and, at times, specify the form of cooperation expected—for example, supply of documents and attendance at hearings—appear in
both standard and customized agreements.253
It is clear that some of these elements would braid the litigation
funding firm-plaintiff relationship on the one hand, with the
plaintiff-attorney relationship on the other. Cooperation with the
attorney would by necessity benefit the litigation funding firm who
is similarly concerned with client shirking once risk has been
shifted onto the litigation funding firm. The attorney’s monitoring
of the client benefits the litigation funding firm. The fee arrangements, including negotiating and specifying division of fees, and
precise mechanisms for collecting fees out of the settlement or
judgment can similarly benefit the funder who has a parallel
collection concern and interest in avoiding ex post disputes regarding calculating the division of the spoils.
This is doubly true because a key concern for investors in
litigation—especially international arbitration or transnational
litigation, as previously discussed—is securing a right in the
judgment or award and effecting a collection. Conversely, VCFs do
not face such a risk of an entrepreneur running off with the spoils
at the time of exit, via sale or IPO, because VCFs hold shares in the
portfolio company so any withdrawal necessarily involves compensation for the entrepreneur’s equity in the enterprise.254
All of this braiding enhances the efficiency of the litigation
funding firm-plaintiff relationship as well as that of the attorney
and her client. And, as noted before, the more inclusive the attorney-client arrangement is of the funder—for example, if the client
authorizes certain types of information to be divulged to the funder
either in the retention agreement or ad hoc during the course of the
representation—the more all parties can enjoy enhanced efficiency
generated by the agents-watching-agents effect. The more lawmak253. See id. at 328-40.
254. See Gilson, supra note 109, at 1086.
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ers protect attorney and/or client communication with the funder
under such doctrines as the common-interest doctrine, the more
clients and others will benefit.255
CONCLUSION
Preliminarily, the key contribution of the foregoing analysis is
that VC contracts can be viewed as a template and springboard for
parties contemplating entering into litigation funding arrangements. Despite the absence of publically available samples or forms,
a model for similar contracting already exists and there is no need
to reinvent the wheel. The litigation funding industry can be spared
years of evolution by looking at, and learning from, the VC industry.
VC contract theory, practice, and doctrine can guide plaintiffs,
lawyers, financiers, and courts on what can be done, what should be
done, and how to do it. In particular, many of the concerns raised by
critics of litigation funding—pressure to settle early, or late; loss of
client control; compromise of attorney’s independent judgment—are
reframed in one, all-encompassing system of checks and balances
that satisfies both ethical and economic concerns.
Just as VCFs purchase shares and thereby become part owners
of a portfolio company, litigation funders should be viewed as coowners of the legal claim and therefore as real parties in interest.256
Some conceptual consequences follow. These conceptual points
should guide lawmakers and regulators. First, funders should ob255. But see Leader Techs., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (D. Del. 2010)
(refusing to extend the common-interest exception to include a financier); Bray & Gillespie
Mgmt. LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 6:07-CV-222-Orl-35KRS, 2008 WL 5054695, at *3 (M.D.
Fla. Nov. 17, 2008) (ruling that the attorney-client privilege between Juridica and Bray &
Gillespie had not been established).
256. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a). At least one U.S. court of appeals has taken that approach
when the funder
financed and controlled the litigation. He was to receive 18.33% of any award the
plaintiffs received plus reimbursement for the expenses of the case. Additionally,
[the Funder] had to approve the filing of the lawsuit; controlled the selection of
the plaintiffs’ attorneys; recruited fact and expert witnesses; received, reviewed
and approved counsel’s bills; and had the ability to veto any settlement
agreements.
Abu-Ghœzaleh v. Chaul, 36 So. 3d 691, 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). Consequently, the court
held that given the level of control exerted by the funder, he had risen to the level of “party.”
Id. at 694.

518

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:455

tain control over the funded litigation. Second, attorneys should
take funders’ input into account. Third, litigation funding firms
should be allowed, and required by their investors, to monitor their
investment. Lawmakers should facilitate this key function—which
enhances value for the client as well as for its co-owner(s)—by
extending the attorney-client privilege to the funders and possibly
the attorney work-product doctrine to work-product that is developed by the funder, that is legal in nature, and that is in direct
relation to the litigation.
Fourth, funders should pay plaintiffs a premium for the control
they receive, be compensated through a scheme that aligns their
interests with those of the clients, and enhance the value of the
claim by providing noncash contributions, including monitoring and
reputation.
Fifth, regulators and lawmakers, including judges, should consider the critical role of reputation markets which, in turn, rely on
the transparency of the industry. In particular, providing information regarding the performance outcomes of litigation funding firms
and their ethical propensities when dealing with plaintiffs and
investors will facilitate the emergence of a reputation market that
can police the industry and support contractual arrangements. This
necessitates choosing transparency over secrecy whenever the
option arises. For example, when requested to seal a litigation
finance contract, such decision makers can instead follow the
precedent set by Judge Kaplan in the Chevron/Ecuador litigation.257
Sixth, there is also a cautionary note to both investors and
plaintiffs that they should disfavor intermediaries who are not
organized as described herein, such as hedge funds that do not
specialize in litigation funding, and therefore cannot effectively
monitor or reduce unique risk and are not subject to reputation
markets.
257. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Several consumer financing companies
doing business in New York State have entered into a stipulation with the Attorney General
of New York that requires the law lending firms who are members of the American Legal
Finance Association to follow certain guidelines. See Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant
to Executive Law § 63(15), Eliot Spitzer, Att’y Gen. N.Y. (Feb. 17, 2005), available at http://
www.americanlegalfin.com/alfasite2/documents/ALFAAgreementWith AttorneyGeneral.pdf
(showing the American Legal Finance Association’s agreement with the Attorney General of
New York and the Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection to comply with certain business practices).

